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INTRODUCTION 
The debate over foreigners corning into the United States to perform temporary or 
seasonal work in its labor intensive industries, in particular the agricultural industry, and 
their treatment is currently an issue spurring much discussion and debate in the business, 
labor activist, and lawmaking realms. In respect to the agricultural industry, vegetable 
producers, field crop producers, ranchers, horticulturalists, and other agricultural sub-
industries are currently dependent on these temporary employees from outside the U.S. 
borders. These producers have found it difficult to find a stable, legal workforce for their 
labor intensive work in timely fashion even through the use of the H-2A Temporary 
Agricultural Worker Program. As such, many agricultural producers have turned away 
from programs like H-2A towards consciously or ignorantly hiring undocumented (i.e. 
illegal) foreign workers to accomplish the time specific work and to remain globally 
competitive. 
This practice has not been without major resistance, however. The U.S. 
government and domestic labor activists contend that the hiring of undocumented 
workers prevents the hiring of domestic laborers and domestic migrant workers 
catalyzing chronic unemployment, poverty, deflated farm wages, decreased worker 
benefits, and adverse working conditions. Other labor groups and unions more 
supportive of the foreign temporary workers view the current conditions of farm labor 
employment (including those within the H-2A program) as inadequate in respect to 
wages, benefits, and working conditions. Both domestic and foreign labor advocates 
demand improvement in this adverse agricultural working environment even if the 
improvement equates to the scrapping of the H-2A program. 
Employers within the agricultural industry have also recognized the failure of the 
H-2A program and are currently pushing reform measures. The trend is for agricultural 
employers to be most concerned with establishing a legal, stable workforce where an 
employer can obtain qualified employees in a timely manner. Currently, employers 
protest that they are faced with only two options for obtaining the quantity of labor they 
need and when they need it. On the one hand, they can use the H-2A program, which is 
cumbersome, confusing, costly, and has a history of not providing labor on a timely basis. 
The other option is to hire undocumented aliens or aliens whose status is unknown to the 
employer (through fraudulent documents) to establish a consistent workforce. This 
option runs the risk of penalization by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 
which could come in the form of steep fines, jail time, or the closing of the business. 
Neither choice is adequate through the eyes of the agricultural employers. 
Therefore, these employers, their organizations, and their supporting members in 
Congress have proposed reforms of the H-2A program or replacement programs in 
Congress so employers can obtain their legal and stable workforce. Yet, none have 
passed due to the resistance from the foreign/ domestic labor advocates and opposing 
members of the government who have different opinions as to what H-2A reform should 
be. Though discouraged, agricultural employers and their supporters are currently 
pushing more reform bills while their past opponents (the White House and conservative 
congressmen) are working on their own reforms. 
The objective of this paper is to determine why the H-2A Temporary Agricultural 
Program has failed, to enumerate underlying causes of the failure, and to predict what 
needs to be done to correct the consistent inadequacy of the program and U.S. 
immigration policy in general. To achieve these conclusions, the history of the H-2A 
program, the program itself, and its past and current attempts at reform will be discussed 
in tum through a domestic and foreign perspective. 
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PART I- THE H-2A TEMPORARY AGRICULTURAL WORKER PROGRAM 
A History of the H-2A Program 
The United States had been dependent on nonimmigrant and migrant labor long 
before the creation of the H-2A temporary agricultural worker program. Since the birth 
of the nation, the U.S. has always looked outside its borders for things not in sufficient 
supply within the country. This is particularly true in respect to unskilled, temporary 
labor. Even when race, class, and political bias sought to restrict foreigner entry, legal 
provisions and business needs have always overcome these obstacles. 
In early U.S. history, most immigrants were from Western Europe. Towards the 
second half of the 19th century, immigrants from Eastern Europe and Asian were also 
beginning to come to the U.S. in large quantities. Given their impoverished status and 
the rise of industrialization in the U.S. during this period, these immigrants were drawn 
into extremely labor-intensive jobs like the railroad or urban industry where there was a 
great need of unskilled or semi-skilled labor. The U.S. economy was thriving at the turn 
of the 20th century in part from riding the strength of this human capital in physically 
demanding jobs. As a result, the U.S. economy became dependent on this type of labor. 
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Agriculture in the U.S. did not start looking outside of the nation's borders for 
labor, however, until after 1900. The early 1900's witnessed only a gradual increase in 
foreign labor in agriculture, most of whom were Mexican. However, the U.S. would not 
encounter a significant need of foreign agricultural laborers u.1til World War I. With a 
significant share of the U.S. labor force leaving to fight in Europe, many industries began 
searching abroad to make up for the loss of employees. The Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA) of 1917 was passed allowing the Commissioner General of Immigration under 
the 91h proviso of Section 3 to admit temporary foreign laborers to work in many U.S. 
industries including the agricultural industry. The inclusion of this provision in the act 
demonstrated the early power of the agricultural industry over organized labor that was 
against the admittance of the foreign labor. Section 3 of the IN A of 1917 resulted in the 
steady increase of foreign agricultural labor until the 1940's. At this time, more powerful 
legislation for admitting temporary foreign workers was passed to meet the U.S.'s World 
War II labor need. 
Most of the admitted workers between the two world wars were Mexican. It has 
been theorized that this difficult agricultural work in the U.S. required individuals who 
could take physical and mental peonage. Mexicans, with their excellent work ethic and 
socio-psychological background, would appear to be the best suited for the work. This, 
combined with Mexico's geographic location adjacent to the U.S., led to negotiations 
between the two countries to create an international contract permitting more foreign 
agricultural laborers in the U.S. than ever before. This contract was first drafted on 
August 4, 1942 and is referred to as The Official Bracero Agreement* after the colloquial 
term bracero meaning field hands (literally: working with the arm). 
• Sometimes referred to as the Second Bracero Program as will be discussed later. 
The Official Bracero Agreement 
"For the temporary migration of Mexican agricultural workers to the United 
States. As revised April 26, 1943, by an exchange of notes between the American 
embassy at Mexico City and the Mexican Ministry for Foreign Affairs."* 
The Bracero Agreement contained four basic provisions: 
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1) Contracted Mexicans will not be involved in military service 
2) Contracted Mexicans will not suffer any acts of discrimination 
3) Contracted Mexicans are given guarantees of transportation, living expenses, and 
Repatriation in Article 29 of the Mexican Federal Labor Law (see Appendix I) 
4) Mexicans can not displace U.S. domestic workers or be employed to reduce pay 
of the domestic workers 
The agreement explained the wages and working conditions for those Mexicans to 
be contracted. The Braceros' wages had to be similar to those already working in the 
region unless the worker could not perform normal work as determined by the Mexican 
Government. Piece rates must be so the average worker could obtain the prevailing wage 
rate of $0.30 per hour. The Mexican Government and the worker must both have 
consented before a worker could change the worksite. Children under 14 years of age of 
the contracted Braceros were not permitted to work and were to receive the same 
education as the children of domestic agricultural working parents. Braceros would also 
receive the same housing, health services, and occupational safety as their domestic 
counterparts. Also, if the contracted workers became unemployed for 75 percent of the 
contracted time period, they were to receive $3.00 each day for this time period equal to 
75 percent of the work period (this is later referred to as the% guarantee) to prevent 
employers from negligently requesting an overabundance of Braceros to drive wages 
down. Finally, a contracted Mexican who did not leave the country after the end of the 
contract period would be considered an illegal alien in the U.S. if the contract was not 
renewed. 
In addition to these wage and employment guarantees, a Savings Fund was 
established under the agreement. Under this provision, the proper U.S. agencies were 
responsible for safekeeping of the Braceros' Rural Savings Fund, which would ultimately 
be transferred through various banks to the Mexican Agricultural Credit Bank. This final 
entity had the ultimate responsibility for these Security Savings. 
The agreement concluded with a few general considerations. First, the U.S. 
government would ensure that the U.S. agencies involved in the agreement would comply 
with it. Secondly, either government had the ability to terminate the contract if a 90-day 
notification was given prior to the desired termination date. And finally, the Mexican 
Government had the sole authority over how many workers were to be permitted to the 
U.S. based on the number requested by the host country. 
Vehicles for the Agreement 
* Hidalgo, Ernesto, et. al. The Official Bracero Agreement. Mexican Foreign Affairs Ministry, 
Mexican Ministry of Labor, Counsel of the American Embassy in Mexico, United States Department 
of Agriculture. 26 Apr. 1943. 
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Various U.S. government regulations and authorities permitted the execution of 
the agreement from 1942 to 1951. In July 1951, the Agricultural Act of 1949 was 
amended with the addition of Title V. This title contained in it Public Law 78 which was 
to govern the future admission of Braceros. The following year, Congress passed a new 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA of '52), also known as the McCarran-Walter Act, 
repealing the INA of 1917. This act contained Public Law 414 also governing the 
entrance of alien workers. As a consequence, any temporary farm worker from Mexico 
entering the U.S. from 1951-64 was officially admitted under one of these two public 
laws. 
The Bracero Agreement officially ended in 1964 even though small numbers of 
Braceros were admitted into the U.S. from 1964- 67. The program basically ran for 22 
years (1942- 64) legally contracting over 4.5 million Mexicans during the time period 
with California receiving more than any other state. Mexico attempted to renew the 
contract with the state of California alone in 1973 with a request to lend 300,000 
agricultural workers a year. California rejected the proposal, however. The U.S., 
therefore, did not legally admit any temporary agricultural workers again until 1977 when 
President Jimmy Carter, by executive order, admitted a few foreign laborers (mainly from 
Mexico, Canada, and the West Indies) to Texas. The H-2A Temporary Agricultural 
Worker Program would not become law until 1986, once again allowing agricultural 
employers to request the services of temporary and seasonal nonimmigrants. 
Effects of the Bracero Program 
The Bracero Program can be seen as a success in light of the millions of Mexican 
participants and the fact that the U.S. agricultural industry would not have been as 
competitive (or quite possibly may not have even survived as a specialized national 
industry) if not for the Braceros. As will be discussed later, Mexico saw the program as 
somewhat of a safety valve for its growing population and unemployment. 
The program did, however, have negative aspects. Mexico, for example, became 
more dependent on the U.S. economy and thus exported precious human capital to the 
North. Many Braceros, once in the U.S., were abused, exploited, and discriminated 
against despite the contract between the two nations. Many lived in impoverished, 
makeshift tents, were given the most difficult and dangerous jobs, and were not given the 
full benefits promised them. 
This exploitation was made possible by the Mexican government ignoring the 
violations, by the vagueness of the agreement and by the lack of strong enforcement of its 
provisions by the U.S. government. The agreement called for many standards but 
generally failed to set or quantify these standards. This, unfortunately, left the 
interpretation of the agreement up to the employer (in the absence of U.S. enforcement), 
who many times acted inhumanely. To worsen the situation, the temporary workers were 
excluded from main federal labor programs like the Fair Labor Standards Act, the 
National Labor Relations Act, and unemployment compensation laws. The only social 
security program the Braceros were apart of was OASI. 
Organization of agricultural labor was non- existent in the U.S. during World War 
II as well. The increase in Braceros after the war only increased the problem. The 
agricultural industry would not see a significant movement towards organized labor until 
after the Korean War when the size of the agricultural workforce contracted with the end 
of the program. 
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The U.S. finally recognized that admitting foreign workers was deterring 
unionization. It also began to understand the correlation between the increase in foreign, 
temporary workers and the increase of illegal immigration. Illegal immigration could 
potentially cause several problems: decrease of domestic employment, the sending of 
money out of the U.S. (thus affecting balance of payments), tax evasion, and the crossing 
the U.S. border without a medical exam. 
Legacy of the Bracero Program 
The influence and effects of the Bracero program are still seen in the U.S. 
agricultural industry. This program set the stage for future nonimmigrant programs and 
established the skeletons of the guarantees and requirements within these programs. The 
H-2A Temporary Agricultural Worker Program is the foremost example of this. As the 
next section will illustrate, items like wages, the % guarantee, and vague terms such as 
"the prevailing practice" all reappear under the H-2A program. It is not surprisingly then 
(as will be discussed in a later section), that the H-2A program is currently problematic, 
much like the Bracero Program was. This includes the lack of worker protection, weak 
government enforcement of the provisions, and increasing illegal immigration. Before 
possible solutions can be discussed in response to these problems, the H-2A program 
must be well described and clarified. 
The H-2A Temporary Agricultural Worker Program 
The statute of the H-2A Temporary Visa Program for the Employment of 
Temporary Alien Agricultural Workers was created by Section 216 of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA) as amended by the Immigration F.cform and Control Act of 
1986 (IRCA) for the admittance of nonimmigrant temporary or seasonal labor through 
the issuance of H-2A visas. The procedures and regulations of the program were 
promulgated by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) under the Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR)- Pertaining to the Employment and Training Administration; Title 20-
Employees Benefits; Chapter V- Employment and Training Administration, DOL; Part 
655- Temporary Employment of Aliens in the United States; Subpart B- Labor 
Certification Process for Temporary Agricultural Employment in the U.S. 
Any agricultural employer who determines that there is a need for nonimmigrant 
workers for temporary/ seasonal employment may apply for these laborers under the H-
2A program. Employers must submit an application to the respective Regional 
Administrator (RA) of the U.S. Department of Labor Employment and Training 
Administration with a copy of the application sent to the local office of the state 
employment service at least 45 days before the need*. Employers are urged to submit the 
application well in advance of the deadline to prevent any delays in hiring as the DOL 
may require clarification or specific requirements which delay processing. The 
documents required for submission are the Application for Alien Employment 
Certification (Form ETA 750, Part A- Offer of Employment\ the Agricultural and Food 
Processing Clearance Order (Form ETA 790), any supplemental information as requested 
by the previous forms, a copy of the job offer including the number of workers requested, 
• Originally, an employer had to apply at least 60 days before the need. 
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and, if applicable, a statement of authorization of agent or association acting on the 
employer's behalf. Employers can file the applications in person, mailed certified return 
receipt requested, or delivered by guaranteed commercial delivery to the appropriate RA 
in the region of employment and to the local state employment service office. If the 
application is certified, the employer must then file a visa petition to the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) for H-2A visas for the aliens entering the U.S. 
Once the application is filed, the RA will first determine if the application is 
acceptable for consideration (i.e. all the requirements of the application forms have been 
met) within seven days of receiving the application. If the RA determines that the 
application is unacceptable, the administrator must inform the employer why the 
application is unacceptable, state what changes need to be made, note what additional 
items need to be submitted, and enumerate the procedures for appealing the RA' s 
decision. The employer then has five days to resubmit the application if desired. 
After the application is deemed acceptable, the RA must make a decision to 
certify or reject the application. Applications will not be certified if it is determined that 
there are sufficient U.S. workers able, willing, and qualified for the job offered, if the 
hiring of nonimmigrant aliens will adversely affect the wages and/ or working conditions 
of U.S. workers of similarly employed work, or if the employer did not "actively" recruit 
U.S. workers for the job offered. TheRA must make the certification decision at least 20 
calendar days before the need. Note that certification will be denied to employers who 
have adversely affected the wages, working conditions, or benefits of U.S. workers, or if 
the employer has violated a condition or material term of a previous H-2A certification 
within the past 2 years of the current application. 
Certain tests must be conducted to verify that the admittance of alien workers will 
not adversely affect domestic labor in these areas. When the local office receives the 
application, the office must promptly create a local job order and begin recruiting U.S. 
workers in the area of intended employment. The local office must also prepare an 
agricultural clearance order to~ allow the recruitment of U.S. workers by the state 
employment service system on an intrastate and interstate basis. TheRA will give the 
state employment service guidance of specific recruitment efforts to be done. 
The employer has recruitment requirements as well. The employer must engage 
in an active recruitment effort for U.S. workers. Active effort is accomplished through 
various means. Basic recruitment begins with newspaper and radio advertising in the 
areas of expected labor supply. These advertisements must enumerate the complete job 
offer and may be required to be bilingual (usually English and Spanish). Employers may 
be required to contact potential employees by phone or writing. The DOL may require 
the employer to contact schools, labor organizations, or other organizations in an effort to 
find domestic workers. Employers may also be required to "ssist local or state 
employment agencies to prepare the job orders used in the ES system. Finally, the RA 
may require other special recruiting efforts by the employer pertaining to the respective 
circumstance. The effort required by employers must be equivalent to that conducted by 
non-H-2A agricultural employers of similar size and work. 
If after the combined recruitment efforts the RA determi.1es that sufficient U.S. 
workers are available to fill the applicant's job order or that the employer did not 
adequately recruit U.S. workers, the administrator will deny the application. The 
application will also be denied if, under the RA's authority, he or she determines that the 
10 
hiring of nonimmigrant aliens will adversely affect the wages, working conditions, or 
benefits of similarly employed U.S. workers or if the employer does not provide proof of 
workers' compensation or equivalent insurance. 
However, if it is discovered that a sufficient amount of U.S. workers is not 
available,* there is no adverse effect, and the employer provides workers' compensation, 
the RA is directed to certify the application. The RA must notify the employer of denial 
or certification at least twenty days before the need. If certified, the employer is required 
to file a visa petition to the INS for the H-2A visas for the admittance of the incoming 
H-2A employees. Employers are charged a $100 application fee, plus $10 per job offer, 
not to exceed $1,000 in total. 
Responsibilities of the H-2A Employer 
To ensure that U.S. workers are preferred over nonimmigrant aliens, U.S. workers 
are not adversely affected, and the H-2A workers are protected once the nonimmigrant, 
seasonal or temporary employees are admitted, the employer must comply with certain 
assurances once the H-2A employees are certified and employed. 
Wages 
The pay for U.S. workers and H-2A workers of similar occupation must be equal. 
The wage rate must be the higher of the respective state's Adverse Effect Wage Rate 
(AEWR), the prevailing wage rate for the respective area, or the federal or state minimum 
wage. 
The AEWR is equal to the annual weighted average hourly wage rate for field and 
livestock workers combined for the region as published by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture+ which all states follow including Ohio. The prevailing wage rate for an 
employee performing any given job is basically set to the wage that the majority of 
employers in the area of similar business and size pay an employee for a similar job. It 
has been common practice in Ohio to have the prevailing wage set at the AEWR since no 
employers have requested the calculation of a separate prevailing wage. Ohio's 
minimum wage is currently the federal rate of $5.15/ hour. 
Housing 
All employees who cannot reasonably return to their residences the same day 
must be provided with free, inspected, and approved housing. H-2A employers should 
schedule an inspection of the housing with the Wage and Hour Division of the U.S. DOL 
at least 30 days before the need. This housing is required to meet Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) and local housing standards. Even though employers 
must provide this housing free of charge, they are permitted to charge the employees for 
resident damage. 
Meals 
The employer must provide three meals a day to each employee or, alternatively, 
provide convenient cooking facilities for employee-prepared meals. When the meals are 
provided, the employer may charge each employee a specified amount for the food. 
Transportation 
The employer must provide three types of transportation when applicable. First, 
the employer must reimburse the transportation and subsistence costs of the employee 
• Note: This cannot be because of a strike or lockout. 
+ See Appendix II 
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from the place of recruitment to the work site once the worker has completed 50% of the 
contract period. Second, the employer must provide transportation from the required 
housing to the work site, free of charge, for workers living in the required housing. And 
finally, the employer must pay for the worker's transportation and subsistence costs from 
the work site to the place of recruitment or the next job after the contracted work period 
is completed.* 
Tools and Supplies 
The employer must provide all necessary tools and supplies for the contracted job 
free of charge (unless the prevailing practice is for the worker to provide them). 
However, the employer may charge for damages. 
%Guarantee 
The employer must guarantee that the worker will be employed for % of the work 
days contracted. In the case of insufficient work to realize this, the employer is required 
to pay the worker what he or she would have earned for wor~,2ng% of the contract period. 
(The employer does not have to comply with this requirement if the worker abandons the 
job or is justifiably terminated.) 
Workers' Compensation Insurance 
The employer must provide all workers with workers' compensation insurance or 
comparable insurance that is at least equal to the respective state's compensation 
insurance. Proof of this insurance must be provided to the RA before an application will 
be certified. 
Fifty-Percent Rule 
The employer must hire any U.S. workers applying for the job offer up until fifty 
percent of the contracted period has elapsed provided that the applicants are willing, able, 
and qualified. 
Records 
It is a requirement for the employer to keep records of a worker's earnings 
(including any deductions from those earnings) and s/he must provide the worker with 
the complete statement of hours worked, earnings, and deductions on each check. 
Frequency of Payments 
Workers should be paid their wages at least twice monthly or more frequently if it 
is the prevailing practice. 
Miscellaneous 
Since H-2A workers are not eligible for the benefits under the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act and FICA, these taxes are not payable by these workers. Also 
note that H-2A employees are not covered under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural 
Worker Protection Act (MSAWPA). 
Violations and Penalties 
The Employment Standards Administration (ESA) of the DOL is the primary 
investigator of the terms and conditions of this employment. This administration 
enforces the employers' contractual obligations and is permitted to assess civil money 
penalties, order employers to pay back-wages, place injunctions against future violations, 
and prohibit future H-2A participation. 
• If the prevailing practice of employers in the same crop and labor market area is to advance transportation 
funds to potential workers, H-2A employers must also advance such fun.f·,. 
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PART II- THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE H-2A PROGRAM 
Statistics of the H-2A Program 
The United States began granting H-2A visas in 1987 following the passage of 
IRCA in 1986. Initially, the majority of the H-2A workers entering the United States, 
unlike the Bracero program, were from Jamaica. However, Jamaican participants have 
continually declined since the start of the program, offset by a continual increase in 
contracted Mexicans. By 1996, Mexicans accounted for 67.9% of the total of all H-2A 
participants. As such, the North American continent has consistently provided U.S. 
agricultural employers with the most H-2A participants (95.9% in 1996). The 
transportation costs to the work site that are required of the employer have undoubtedly 
influenced this statistic. However, the South American continent has had an increasing 
role in the program while employees of Europe and Oceania have been minimal (see 
Table 1). 
Table 1- H-2A Workers entering the U.S. by country (1987- 96)* 
COUNTRY 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Barbados 416 312 263 60 
Dominica 100 100 110 23 
Dominican Republic 16 16 19 22 27 17 21 
Jamaica 11,414 12,609 12,051 13,881 10,815 8,355 6099 5697 4231 
Mexico 2499 3,683 4,993 6,216 5,829 6655 7156 10,353 
St. Lucia 562 565 580 209 
St. Vincent 552 550 620 290 
Other 67 29 38 81 23 16 34 14 
Total, North America 13,111 16,673 17,361 18,890 17,707 14,220 12,794 12,897 12,257 
Chile 53 53 81 73 57 72 
Peru 116 140 198 277 308 294 341 
Other 1 4 2 4 
Total, South America 0 0 117 194 255 360 385 351 413 
United Kingdom 2 39 12 16 23 10 7 8 12 
Poland 16 15 37 53 10 11 18 
Other 62 72 38 23 12 9 10 19 
Total, Euroee 2 101 100 69 83 75 26 29 49 
Australia 15 18 20 23 32 22 38 
New zealand 7 8 68 103 74 98 97 
Total, Oc!i!ania 0 0 22 26 88 126 106 120 135 
Total, Africa 0 0 0 0 2 4 14 3 
Total, Asia 0 8 14 19 140 15 27 7 5 
TOTAL 13,113 16,782 17,614 19,199 18,273 14,789 13,342 13,418 12,862 
• Education and Human Services Division. H-2A Agricultural Guestworker Program: Changes Could 
Improve Services to Employers and Better Protect Workers. U.S. General Accounting Office. Washington: 
Dec. 1997. 
1996 
19 
4231 
10,353 
14 
14,617 
70 
383 
453 
5 
31 
19 
55 
31 
74 
105 
2 
3 
15,235 
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COUNTRY Rate in% '96 
Barbados 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 0.1 
Jamaica 27.8 
Mexico 67.9 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent 
Other 0.09 
Total, North America 95.9 
Chile 0.5 
Peru 2.5 
Other 
Total, South America 3 
United Kingdom 0.03 
Poland 0.2 
Other 0.1 
Total, Euro1;1e 0.4 
Australia 0.2 
New Zealand 0.5 
Total, Oceania 0.7 
Total, Africa 0.01 
Total, Asia 0.01 
TOTAL 100 
Despite the increasing role of Mexican participants in the early '90s, the total 
number ofH-2A participants reached its all time low by 1996 (12,862). When the use of 
the program began escalating again after 1996, the DOL received 1,817 applications from 
employers, certifying 17,557 nonimmigrant aliens out of 19,853 requested. All these 
numbers have continued to increase until the present day. Last year (fiscal year 2000) 
48,480 workers were requested from 6,356 requesting employers (see Table 2). 
Table 2- Regional Office and U.S. Totals in Fiscal Year 2000* 
Regional Offices Workers Requested Workers Certified Employers Requesting 
1- Boston 3458 3328 473 
Employers Certified 
461 
I· New York 2634 2624 190 
II- Philadelphia Hub 4187 3864 871 
Ill- Atlanta Hub 26,366 24,350 2555 
IV- Dallas Hub 4655 3864 415 
IV- Denver Affiliate 1882 1254 673 
V- Chicago Hub 1106 1027 80 
V- Kansas City Affiliate 882 686 120 
VI· San Francisco Hub 2069 1980 483 
VI· Seattle Affiliate 1241 1030 496 
TOTALS 48,480 44,017 6356 
*Kilbane, Grace A. 2000 H-2A Report COWS Information Bulliten No. 03-01) Office of Workforce 
Security. U.S. Department of Labor. Washington: 3 Jan. 2001. 
190 
852 
2496 
361 
472 
66 
104 
446 
450 
5898 
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Ohio is a part of the Region V- Chicago Hub with Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, 
Minnesota, and Wisconsin. In 1996, Region V- Chicago Hut- received almost the fewest 
applications with only about 500 workers certified. The Chicago Hub continued to 
receive the lowest numbers of applications received in 2000 with Region 1- New York 
receiving the second fewest, over double that of the Chicago Hub. However, the Chicago 
Hub surpassed its Region V counterpart, Kansas City Affiliate, for workers requested and 
workers certified. The Atlanta hub led all categories in 2000 (see Table 2). 
Within Ohio, horticultural employers requested over five times more employees 
than any other Ohio crop employer group with 487 employees requested and certified. 
However, these H-2A workers were requested by only 20 employers (see Table 3). 
Table 3- Ohio (Region V- Chicago Hub) Fiscal Year 2000 Crop Activity* 
Crops Workers Requested Workers Certified Employers Requesting Employers Certified 
Diversified Crop 20 14 3 2 
Farmworker 11 
Grain 
Horticultural 487 
Livestock 2 
Stable Attendant 3 
Tomatoes 11 
Vegetables 72 
TOTAL 607 
11 
0 
487 
2 
2 
0 
72 
588 
1 
20 
5 
33 
1 
0 
20 
1 
0 
5 
30 
In summary, North American countries have been and most likely will continue to 
be the origin of nearly all entering H-2A employees. More specifically, Mexico provides 
the majority of the current H-2A workers entering the U.S. Also, as will be discussed in 
a later section, this trend will most likely continue. Finally, one should notice that 
employer applications, worker requests, and worker certifications have been consistently 
increasing since 1996. In fact, last year's numbers were the highest in the history of the 
program. It should be noted, however, that the number of H-2A employees still remains 
an extremely small percentage of total U.S. farm employees. 
Farm Labor Statistics 
"Farm worker wages have stagnated, annual earnings remain below the poverty line, (and) 
farm workers experience chronic underemployment ... "+ 
According to the Farm Labor Survey released Aug. 1-:, 2001 by the National 
Agricultural Statistics Service of the Agricultural Statistics Board (USDA), the U.S. 
agricultural industry employed 1,374,000 hired farm and service workers in July 2001. 
Thus, H-2A workers (44,017 in 2000) still make up an extremely small percentage of 
total farm labor employment. 
H-2A workers resemble total farm labor in respect to farm worker ethnicity and 
place of birth, however. According to the findings of the National Agricultural Workers 
Survey (NA WS) for years 1997-1998, the majority of farm workers (77%) were 
• Kilbane, Grace A. 2000 H-2A Report (OWS Information Bulliten No. 03-01) Office Workforce 
Security. U.S. Department of Labor. Washington: 3 Jan. 2001. 
+Office of Program Economics. National Agricultural Workers Survey: 1997- 1998. U.S. Department of 
Labor. Washington. Mar. 2000. <http://www.dol.gov/dol/asp/public/programs/agwork/report-8.pdf> 
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Mexican-born. The next highest groups are U.S.-born Hispanics (9%) and U.S.-born 
whites. The remaining percentage of farm labor is made up of African-Americans, Latin 
Americans, other U.S.-born ethnic groups, Asians, and other f01 eign-born employees (see 
Chart 1). 
Chart 1- Farmworker Ethnicity and Place of Birth* 
Farmworker Ethnicity and Place of Birth 
ll:.ll Mexican Born 
• US-born Hispanic 
D US-born White 
D US-born African 
American 
• Other US-born 
EJ Latin American 
Born 
• Asian Born 
D Other Foreign 
Born 
Unlike the H-2A program, more in-depth research has been conducted giving a 
more complete profile of all farm workers and their employment in general. The average 
age of farm workers is 31 . Half are below the age of 29. Half are married. Men 
comprise 80% of the farm workers. Only half of the total are married. Consistent with 
the statistics of farm worker place of birth and ethnicity, 84% speak Spanish as a native 
language and only 12% speak English as a native language. Furthermore, only 1110 of 
foreign-born workers are fluent in English. Farm workers can work in agriculture 
without fluency in English because of the unskilled or semi-~.ki1Jed nature of most farm 
work. In fact, the average farm laborer has completed only s~x years of formal education. 
These facts help explain why farm wages and benefits remain low. 
The most important correlation, if not cause of low farm wages and benefits, 
could be the high percentage of unauthorized (undocumented) workers in the farm labor 
pool. Referring again to NAWS '97-'98, 52% of the farm labo1· supply is reportedly 
ineligible to legally work in the U.S. This large amount of undocumented persons 
(assuming that many of them are still being hired despite their unauthorized status) may 
be creating a surplus in the farm labor supply. Such a surplus would drive down farm 
wages and benefits especially if many workers of the overabundant supply are of illegal 
status and thus have no rights to minimum wages or benefits. 
In nominal terms, farm wages have increased from $5.24 per hour in 1989 to 
$6.18 per hour in 1998. This is only an 18% increase in nominal agricultural wages 
compared to a 32% increase in nominal wages for non-agricultural workers over the same 
* Office of Program Economics. National Agricultural Workers Survey: 1997- 1998. U.S . Department of 
Labor. Washington . Mar. 2000. <http ://www.dol.gov/dollasp/public/programs/agwork!report-8 .pdf> 
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time period. The trend is worse for farm laborers in real wages. In 1989, the average real 
wage of farm laborers was $6.89 per hour. This rate fell to $6.18 per hour in real terms in 
1998, a loss of 11% of purchasing power. Because of this, 61% of farm laborers are 
living below the poverty line given that, on average, single farm workers earn less than 
$7500 a year and families earn less than $10,000 a year. 
Benefits have also been declining for farm laborers. The '97-'98 NAWS reports 
that benefits such as Medicaid, food stamps, and other social services have been 
consistently declining in the last decade. More specifically, only 5% had health 
insurance, only 20% were covered under unemployment insurance, and only 10% 
received vacation time. To make the situation worse, less than 50% of these farm 
laborers owned a vehicle of transportation and the statistic of 113 of farm laborers owning 
a home in 1994-1995 has fallen to only 14% of farm laborers with home ownership in 
1997-1998. Even though 21% of farm laborers received housing costs paid for by the 
employer, it is still not surprising that many farm workers live in substandard housing (or 
no housing), and in poor sanitation. However, workers still move to where the jobs are as 
up to 56% of farm laborers are migrants. This could very well be another indicator of the 
effect of illegal agricultural workers on the farm labor work force as undocumented 
persons from foreign countries would typically be more mobile than domestic workers 
given their illegal status and needs. 
Illegal Aliens, the INS, and the SSA 
lllegal aliens in the U.S. are defined as those persons entering or residing in the 
U.S. without legal authority or permission. The hiring of illegal aliens is the employment 
of persons not legally permitted or eligible to work in the U.S. 
Illegal immigrants come from two sources. The first source is those citizens of 
other countries crossing the U.S. border into the U.S. illegally. The second source is 
those citizens of foreign countries granted temporary permission to live and/ or work for 
a specific period of time in the U.S. (nonimmigrants) but remain in the U.S. after their 
legal time period has expired. Nonimmigrants are granted U.S. admission as either 
temporary workers or trainees, exchange visitors, intra-company transferees, or N AFT A 
workers. As stated in the previous section, Mexico provides more temporary workers 
and trainees than any other country. 
In 1998, 30.1 million visitors were admitted for temporary residence in the U.s.* 
Some of these nonimmigrants will ultimately be naturalized (the conferring of U.S. 
citizenship, by any means, upon a person after birth). However, many will remain 
illegally in the U.S. after their legal residence period has expired, especially those 
temporary agricultural workers of the H-2A program. 
The INS estimated that about 5 million illegal immigrants (with a range of 4.6-5.4 
million) were residing in the U.S. by 1996. This 1.1 million increase from the October 
1992 estimation implies an annual growth of 275,000 illegals. If this trend has remained 
consistent over the past 4 to 5 years, the current illegal population should be over 6 
million people or over 2% of the U.S. population*. 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy. 1998 Statistical Yearbook oithe INS. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service Washington: Jan. 2001. 
<http://www .ins. usdoj .gov I graphics/ aboutins/statistics/1998yb. pdf> 
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Of the 5 million illegals residing in the U.S. in 1996, it was reported that as many 
as 2.7 million (54%) of them were from Mexico (see Table 4). Overstays of temporary 
permits constituted 41% of the illegals but only16% of the Mexican illegals were a result 
of overstays. Therefore, the majority of Mexican illegals must be from illegal border 
crossings. 
Given that the majority of illegals are from Mexico, it can be inferred that the 
source of most of the illegal immigrants in the U.S. are from Mexicans crossing the U.S. 
border illegally. In respect to the residence of illegals in the U.S., the states of California 
and Texas not surprisingly are estimated to house the majority of illegals with 2,000,000 
and 700,000 respectively in 1996 (see Table 5). 
Table 4- Origins Estimated Illegal Immigrants in the U.S.* 
Country Estimated lllegals in U.S. '96 
1. Mexico 2,700,000 
2. El Salvador 335,000 
3. Guatemala 165,000 
4. Canada 120,000 
5. Haiti 105,000 
6. Philippines 95,000 
7. Honduras 90,000 
8. Dominican Republic 75,000 
9. Nicaragua 70,000 
10. Poland 70,000 
From all countries combined 5,000,000 
Table 5- Estimated Illegals in Top Ten U.S. States • 
State Estimated lllegals '96 
1. California 2,000,000 
2. Texas 70,000 
3. New York 540,000 
4. Florida 350,000 
5. Illinois 290,000 
6. New Jersey 135,000 
7. Arizona 115,000 
8. Massachusetts 85,000 
9. Virginia 55,000 
10. Washington 52,000 
All states combined 5,000,000 
INS Enforcement 
The INS has the responsibility for the enforcement of U.S. immigration laws. 
This includes the arresting of aliens violating the Immigration and Nationality Act 
residing illegally in the U.S. The INS attempts to control the illegal immigrant 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy. 1998 Statistical Yearbook oft' e INS. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service Washington: Jan. 2001. 
<http://www. ins. usdo j .gov/ graphics/ aboutins/statistics/1998yb. pdf> 
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population by preventing entrance to those trying to enter the U.S. illegally, and arresting 
those who were once legal to work and reside in the U.S. but have overstayed their permit 
(visa) and are now of illegal status. In 1998, the INS apprehr:'1ded 1,679,439 illegal 
immigrants in the U.S. The Border Patrol, in cooperation with the INS, arrested 
1,555,776 people attempting to cross the border illegally. Consistent with the estimation 
that much of the illegal population in the U.S. is from Mexicans crossing illegally, the 
border patrol reported that 97% of its arrests occurred at the Southwest border of the 
* U.S. 
The hiring of such persons with ineligible (i.e. undocumented, illegal) work status 
is illegal under U.S. law. However, U.S. employers, knowingly or unknowingly, 
consistently hire undocumented workers. Agricultural employers, for example, 
consciously hire undocumented workers because the labor is cheaper and perhaps 
unavailable legally. Employers unknowingly hire ineligible workers because applying 
undocumented persons present fraudulent documentation to the employers fooling the 
employer into believing that he or she is legally allowed to work in the U.S. Conscious 
or not of their ineligible status, U.S. employers of undocumented workers are in perpetual 
danger of being caught by the INS through onsite enforcement (raids). Even though INS 
onsite enforcement decreased before 1997, the INS has recently increased its efforts to 
crack down on illegal employment through onsite enforcement (see Table 6). Although 
most work-site arrests result from the INS tracking down illegal immigrants who have 
committed a crime (86% of those arrested), all employers employing undocumented labor 
run the risk of being caught by the INS and incurring costly fines, losing crucial labor at 
crucial times, and/or losing the business. 
Table 6- Number of INS Worksite Enforcements By Yea/ 
Year Number of Enforcements 
1992 7053 
1995 
1996 
1998 
5283 
5149 
7795 
Eligibility Verification 
I-9 Form 
The IRCA of 1986 created the employment verification process, which includes 
the I-9 form. All new employees of any U.S. employer must fill out this form before or 
on the first day of work. Employers must submit the form to the INS within three days of 
the first day of employment. Upon filling out the I-9 form, employers must verify the 
employee's identity and work eligibility. 
Problems with hiring unknown illegals arise from this verification process. 
Employers are required to accept all documents conferring identity and eligibility if the 
employer can honestly say and reasonably believe that the docvments are authentic. 
Employers are therefore susceptible to accepting fraudulent documents as authentic 
documents, thus ignorantly hiring illegal employees. Furthermore, the INS currently 
*Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy. 1998 Statistical Yearbook of the INS. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service Washington: Jan. 2001. 
<http://www .ins. usdoj .gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/1998yb.pdf> 
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allows employers to accept eight different documents proving both employee identity and 
eligibility, 12 proving just identity, and seven proving only eligibility. Employees may 
choose which of these acceptable documents they wish to use to prove identity and 
eligibility without the discretion of the employer. The most common documents used to 
prove identity and eligibility, however, are birth certificates, drivers' licenses, and Social 
Security Cards, which are documents not controlled by the INS. Therefore, unlike INS 
documents, these documents not controlled by the INS cannot be proven authentic 
through the verification program. 
Birth certificates are the most common document to prove U.S. citizenship. 
However, there is no national standard for the birth certificate format, making this 
document very vulnerable to fraudulent production. It is much more difficult to create a 
passable fraudulent driver's license than a fake birth certificate. illegal immigrants, 
however, can obtain an authentic driver's license with a fake Social Security Card, since 
most drivers' bureaus do not verify Social Security Numbers before issuing licenses. 
Since driver's licenses prove identity and contain a Social Security Number, employers 
often use this document alone when verifying identity and eligibility. Therefore, 
employers are, again, vulnerable to unknowingly hiring illegal immigrants. 
Fraudulently produced Social Security Cards (SSCs) are probably the most 
difficult to pass employer verification as a national standard does exist for authentic SSCs. 
The INS seized 24,000 fake Social Security Cards in Los Angeles alone in May 1998. 
However, due to a lack of employer training in recognizing fraudulent documents, many 
illegals are still able to gain employment with fraudulent documents, including false 
SSCs. 
W-2 Form 
Employers are also required to file W-2 forms to the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) for all their employees by the last day of February (last day of 
March if filed electronical1y) to report the taxes and wages for the past calendar year, 
especially when income, Social Security, or Medicare taxes are withheld. The Social 
Security Number and name of the employee must be correct on the form as the SSA does 
not post the employees' wages and taxes until both are verified. To prevent problems 
after the W-2's have been filed, an employer can verify the Social Security Numbers on 
the W-2 with the Enumeration Verification Service (EVS) a[ is with the I-9 form. 
Verification is free of charge when employers are verifying former, current, or new 
employees (after a commitment to hire). The SSA will use the EVS to verify the 
employee's name, Social Security Number, date of birth, and sex with the SSA master 
files. 
There are a several ways employers can use the EVS depending on the number 
desired to be verified. To verify up to five employees, employers can call 1-800-772-
6270 toll free on weekdays 7AM to 7PM EST. To verify up to 50 employees, employers 
can submit the name, Social Security Number, date of birth, and sex of the employees on 
paper or diskette to the local Social Security office. Verifying over 50 employees 
requires a registration process. With all methods of verification, the employer is required 
to disclose his or her Employer Identification Number (EIN). Employers are encouraged 
to use the EVS before submitting W-2 forms, as there is a $50 penalty to both the 
employer and employee by the IRS (who uses the forms for tax purposes) if there is a 
mismatch between theW -2 and the SSA master files. 
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A noted mismatch, however, does not necessarily indicate the employer hired an 
undocumented worker during the previous calendar year. Mismatches could simply have 
resulted from name changes, payroll record transcript errors, typographical errors, 
incomplete or blank names reported, incomplete or blank Social Security Numbers 
reported, etc. However, the prevailing opinion and nationally accepted practice is that the 
Privacy Act does not prohibit the employer from using the mismatched information to 
comply with obligations under INA (e.g. the 1-9 form). In other words, the employer 
must discover the reason for the mismatch once he or she is knowledgeable of the 
mismatch. If the mismatch is a result of hiring an undocumented worker, the employer 
will be in violation with the INS if he or she continues to employ the undocumented 
worker. High year-to-year turnover of undocumented employees in agriculture is a 
logical result of these policies. 
Attempts by the INS to Reduce Fraud 
Due to the fact that employers unaware of the employees' eligibility are 
continually hiring many undocumented workers, the INS has attempted to reduce the 
employing of undocumented workers through different verification methods that check 
the authenticity of employee presented information and documents. The implementation 
of the EVS, previously mentioned, verifies that the Social Security Number presented by 
the employee on any document is correct. The passage of the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigration Reform Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 cut the number of documents the 
employee can present to the employer in half (Sec.274a). This legislation proposed a 
new employment reverification form, and prompted the SSA to develop a new Social 
Security Card prototype less susceptible to fraud. The legislation also directed the 
Secretary of Transportation to establish federal standards that must be met by state-issued 
driver's licenses (e.g. standards for establishing the true identity of the applicant or verify 
the applicant's account number), and directed the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to deal with the vulnerability of birth certificates to be fraudulently produced 
because of the lack of a national standard. 
The INS is also trying to establish an onsite electronic verification system to 
instantly verify employee information. Such a program has yet to be established, 
however, because of the cost to create it and the lack of employer participation. 
Unfortunately for employers, the INS's other attempt to curb the hiring of illegals has 
been a move toward increased work site enforcement (raids). Although it is too early to 
determine the pattern of implementation by the INS or the effects of the increase of work 
site enforcements, employers now fear more than ever legal sanctions against them for 
employing undocumented persons. This is especially true in the agricultural industry, as 
employers are more vulnerable and more inclined to hire illegal immigrants due to the 
temporary/seasonal nature of the work and the strenuous, low-paying jobs it offers that 
are unattractive to legal domestic workers. 
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PART III· REFORM OF THE H-2A TEMPORARY AGRICULTURAL WORKER 
PROGRAM 
Reasons for Reform 
The U.S. agricultural industry, for the most part, produces primary commodities 
in global competition. This competition, cost increasing U.S. laws and regulations, the 
physical demand of agricultural work, and the seasonal aspect of the work keep the 
wages and benefits of agricultural labor low. Therefore, malty domestic workers, 
unwilling to work in the agricultural industry, choose work in industries with higher pay, 
less physical demands, and year round employment. Therefore, agricultural employers 
have come to depend on the illegal labor supply to meet their labor needs. 
The reliance has several consequences. First, agricultural employers fear INS 
prosecution if they are found to be knowingly employing ineligible workers possibly 
resulting in the loss of an entire year's crop, costly fines, imprisonment, or the shutting 
down of the business. Second, relying on illegal foreigners only encourages more aliens 
to enter the U.S. illegally in search of work. As a consequence, the trend of declining 
farm wages and benefits continues for U.S. and legal alien workers. Further more, 
employed illegals are subject to many dangers crossing the U.S. border illegally, and 
abuse and exploitation by their U.S. employers since U.S.law does not cover them. The 
H-2A program was established to provide agricultural employers with a legal and stable 
labor supply so employers would not be tempted or forced to hire illegal immigrants. Yet, 
few agricultural employers actually use the H-2A program. 
Employers avoid the program because it is complicated and confusing to use. 
Employers have received poor information about how to use the program and how to 
apply. The DOL handbook created to relate this information is outdated and incomplete. 
Filling out the application for H-2A employees is only the beginning of the confusion for 
employers. Using the program can be just as confusing and cumbersome. Employers 
must comply with multiple requirements to multiple agencies. Employers many times 
are unable to determine if they are in compliance with not only the requirements and 
agencies at the federal level, but also those at the state and local levels. Like the Bracero 
contract, the writing of the program is very vague leaving employers to question what 
constitutes a "prevailing practice", for example. 
Second, the program is extremely slow. In its Report to Congressional 
Committees in December 1997, the General Accounting Office reported that over one-
third of the DOL's certifications of applications were late (past the 20 day before need 
deadline). Some were not even certified or denied before the actual date of need. To 
make this situation worse, the DOL does not keep records in respect to the time of 
certification or why a certification would have required additional time, which impedes 
efforts to remedy the situation. Delays could be explained through the extent of time 
needed to test the market for sufficient workers or adverse effects. Yet, these tests have 
been highly ineffective in achieving their goals thereby only adding to the long process of 
H-2A application certification. 
Because the program is designed to encourage employers to hire U.S. workers 
over temporary workers, the program is terribly costly. The recruitment required by 
employers is very expensive, exhausts valuable time, and historically has proven very 
ineffective. The prevailing wage and AEWR are calculated by grouping together 
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dissimilar occupations resulting in a higher or lower wage in some areas than it should be. 
The housing, transportation, meals, etc. expenses (although included with good intention) 
are each of high cost to the employer. As previously mentioned, agricultural employers 
must compete globally disallowing U.S. employers to pass tl~c.: costs from these U.S. 
regulations on to the consumer. These costs, in fact, make the program prohibitive to 
employers encouraging the hiring of illegal immigrants. 
Despite the costs of these guarantees and benefits to the workers, the program is 
failing to provide adequate worker protection as well. First and foremost, H-2A 
employees are not covered under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker 
Protection Act (MSA WPA). Even for the laws that do cover them, the workers typically 
do not understand the laws or are unaware of them (remember only one- tenth of farm 
workers are fluent in English). Finally, some of the H-2A worker protections are 
contradictory. The % guarantee, for example, is not paid to workers eligible for this 
guarantee until after the work period. Yet, the law requires temporary nonimmigrant 
workers to leave the country immediately after the work period ends. Obviously, many 
recipients of this guarantee will not be able to receive their wages from the guarantee 
before returning to their country of origin. Once at home, these workers do not have the 
power or means to demand their due wages. 
Given these detrimental faults of the program, agricultural employers are faced 
with a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, employers can attempt to use the H-2A 
program risking overestimating (therefore incurring more co~ts) or underestimating 
(therefore not having enough workers) the amount of labor needed (because they must 
estimate their need 45 days before the need), not receiving the labor on time, being in 
violation of the program out of ignorance, and paying high usage fees. On the other hand, 
agricultural employers can reject using the program and instead hire illegal employees or 
simply not find enough labor. This option carries the risk of losing labor (possibly at the 
time of peak labor need, i.e. harvest time) and being sanctioned with fines, jail time, and/ 
or the shutting down of the business by the INS. 
Therefore, employers, their organizations, and sympathizing members of 
Congress have long demanded and worked for reform of the H-2A program or the 
creation of a better program to replace it. The goals of these reformers has consistently 
been to establish a stable and legal workforce, acquire qualified labor in a timely manner, 
and improve (if only to quiet their opposition) labor safety, working conditions, and 
worker protections with the ultimate goal of keeping agricultural employers globally 
competitive. 
The Reform Bills 
The Aglobs Bills 
The first major bill introduced to Congress to reform the H-2A program was the 
Temporary Agricultural Worker Act of 1997. This bill proposed a 24-month pilot 
program that would allow the admission of temporary or seasonal agricultural workers 
similar to that of the H-2A program. It differed from the H-2A program in important 
ways, most notably a trust fund was to guarantee the return of the temporary workers to 
their home countries. Despite the proposed changes, the billed was not passed but was 
reintroduced a year later as the Temporary Agricultural Worker Act of 1998 with the 
same outcome. 
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Despite failure of these bills, yet another reform bill was introduced by Sen. Ron 
Wyden of Oregon entitled the Agricultural Job Opportunity Benefits and Security Act of 
1998 (AgJobs '98). This bill was designed to create a work visa program more efficient 
than the H-2A program. Its key provisions were the creation of a national system of 
voluntary registries of legal U.S. workers interested in farm employment, the 
streamlining of the admittance and the extension of stay of nonimmigrant agricultural 
workers to occupy the jobs registries were unable to fill, the use of market-based wages 
(different from the H-2A AEWR and prevailing wages), and the protection of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act. 
Many thought this bill could establish a truly workable program. Despite 
bipartisan support, the bill was politically unattractive to labor unions, labor advocates, 
and Latino leaders. The bill ultimately failed because these interests demanded a 
legalization provision giving amnesty to all illegal immigrants not enumerated in the bill. 
Opponents also felt that the guarantees of the bill, like those of the existing H-2A 
program, did not provide sufficient protection against adverse effects to U.S. workers nor 
provide adequate wages, working conditions, and benefits for all workers. 
In response, the agricultural employer organizations and their Congressional 
supporters reintroduced the bill in 1999 and 2000, AgJobs '99 (S.1814) and AgJobs '00 
(H.R. 4056), with considerable adjustments (the AgJobs '99 and AgJobs '00 bills are 
identical so the following discussion pertains to both bills).* The new AgJobs bill, 
introduced by Sen. Gordon Smith of Oregon, was "to establish a system of registries of 
temporary agricultural workers to provide for a sufficient supply of such workers and to 
amend the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to streamline procedures for the 
admission and extension of stay of nonimmigrant agricultural workers". 
Unlike AgJobs '98, Title Y of AgJobs '99 ('00) was written for the adjustment of 
the legal status of illegal alien agricultural workers by the Attorney General in the U.S. 
This adjustment of legal status would be subject to specific requirements that would have 
to be met by the illegal alien desiring adjustment. They are as follows: 
1) The alien must have performed agricultural work in the U.S. for at least 880 
hours or 150 workdays (the lesser of the two) during a 12-month period prior to 
October 27, 1999. 
2) The alien must apply for the adjustment by 12 months after the effective date 
of the bill. 
3) The alien must be eligible under 212(a)(9)(B) of the INA (the current illegal 
status will not be held against the alien). 
4) Legal status given to the alien will be for seven consecutive years but the alien 
can only reside in the U.S. for 300 days each year. (Exception for aliens who 
have acquired permanent residence, have a minor child born in the U.S. before 
enactment of the bill or those performing agricultural work more than 240 days a 
year.) 
• Because a lot of the current H-2A reform bills were heavily influenced by the contents of these two biJls 
and the following one to be discussed, these three bills will be discussed in greater detail. 
+Title I of S.l814 was actually added by the amendment of The Farworker Adjustment Act (S.1815) to the 
bill. 
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5) The alien can work anywhere in the U.S. but it must h.e in agricultural work. 
6) The employer of the illegal alien must provide the work record to the alien and 
the INS. 
7) The alien can become a permanent resident if the worker does a minimum 
work requirement in five to seven years. The requirement is a work period of 
1040 hours or 180 days (the lesser of the two) a year, or work 240 days a year if 
the alien remains in the U.S. over 300 days a year. The alien must apply for 
permanent residence no later than six months after the five to seven years of 
completing this requirement. The alien can be deported if he or she does not meet 
this application requirement. Also, the Attorney General can deny permanent 
residence if the alien fraudulently acquired the seven year adjustment status or 
broke U.S. law during the adjustment period. 
Note: Only 20% of those adjusted aliens would be gr·uted permanent residence 
per year. 
8) The alien has the burden of proof to show that he or she has met the work 
requirement for adjustment. The alien is permitted to ask for an outside party to 
aid the alien with this process. 
9) The information can only be used for determining completion of adjustment 
requirements. 
10) Section 101 or 102 of the INA does not apply to an alien seeking legal 
adjustment or permanent residence. 
Title II of AgJobs '99 covers the Agricultural Worker Registries. Here, the 
Secretary of Labor would have the responsibility of creating and maintaining a registry 
system with a database of workers who want to work in the agricultural industry along 
with their employment status. The registry covers U.S. workers as well as eligible 
nonimmigrant workers with adjustment status. U.S. workers would have the priority over 
the adjusted nonimmigrants, however. Furthermore, adjusted nonimmigrants can only be 
referred to jobs they are qualified for and can be removed fror;n the registry for six 
months the first time they fail to show up to the job they hav"'committed to through 
referral and removed for a year upon failure to show up a second time. A registry 
participant will be removed from the database if the registrant declines three jobs referred 
to him or her within a three-month period. Finally, an employer may require all 
applicants for a job to register with the registry before hiring. 
The next title (Title III) of AgJobs '99 ('00) covers the H-2A reforms. The H-2A 
reform under this bill begins with changes in obtaining H-2A employees. The first major 
change is that employers would be able to apply to the Secretary of Labor (SOL) for 
workers to fill the vacant jobs as late as 28 days before the need. The SOL then would 
have seven days to accept or reject the application along with notification to the employer 
equal to that under the existing H-2A program. If the application were accepted, the SOL 
first would immediately begin a search of the registry in an attempt to find ready, willing, 
able, and qualified registrants to fill the employer's job offers before admitting H-2A 
employees. If the SOL finds ready, willing, able, and qualified registrants, he or she 
would contact the chosen registrants about the job offer. If they accept, those registrants 
would be directed to the employer's worksite and the employer would be notified. The 
employer would have to hire these contacted registrants if th;•y are qualified for the 
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positions offered. The registry search would continue for seven days before the need if 
the registrants contacted reject the offer or if enough registrants have not be found for all 
the jobs offered by the employer. H-2A employees would not be admitted unless not all 
the jobs are filled through the registry by the seven-day before need. 
The next proposed reform to the H-2A program under this is employer 
requirements. First, the employer is given the liberty under this act to request a unique 
prevailing wage for his or her area subject to approval by the SOL More importantly, 
this act introduces the option for the employer to offer its H-2A and registrant employees 
(only if H-2A employees are working there as well) housing equal to that of the existing 
H-2A program or a housing allowance. This housing allowance given to eligible 
employees would be equal to the statewide average fair market rental price for existing 
housing for non-metropolitan counties in the state of the employer's worksite determined 
by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 
for two bedroom dwellings. This reform measure is designed to allow more agricultural 
employers to be monetarily eligible for the H-2A program by removing the high costs of 
building housing (for those employers without housing) to meet the existing H-2A 
housing requirement through this housing allowance option. Most of the other 
guarantees to employees required of the employer in this bill, including the 50% and % 
guarantees, are nearly identical to those under H-2A. The transportation reimbursement 
transportation guarantee is not given to employees taking permanent residency less than 
100 miles away from the worksite or if the employee is not living in employer provided 
housing (this includes the housing allowance). 
The final section of Title III, Section 305, enumerates amendments to Section 218 
of INA. This most important amendments to Section 218 under this act pertain to H-2A 
employee eligibility, period of admission, and identification. With these amendments, 
H-2A employees are disqualified from the H-2A program if they have violated the act or 
violated U.S. admission law within the past five years. H-2A employees can only remain 
in the U.S. for the lesser of the employment period or 10 months a year. However, the 
amendments allow the H-2A employee 14 days to find more work unless an extension for 
continued work is filed. Finally, Section 305 of AgJobs '99 ('00) would establish a new 
non-reproducible ID recorded in an ID system for H-2A employees. 
Title IV of this bill covers miscellaneous provisions including complaint 
procedures, and employer violations similar to those established under the existing H-2A 
program with no pertinent discussion required here. 
Opinions Concerning Aglobs '99 ('00) 
When this bill was introduced by Senators Smith, Graham, and Craig, they and 
other proponents of the bill felt the act, if passed, would effectively serve agricultural 
employers, domestic laborers, and foreign laborers in the U.S. through its three parts: 
amnesty, registry, and H-2A reform. 
AgJobs advocates believed that an amnesty program would be beneficial in 
several ways. First, they noted that the amnesty would be adjusting the most experienced 
and committed workers to legal status given the eligibility requirements. These adjusted 
workers would now receive protection under U.S. law as well. The amnesty would also 
serve as immigration control through creating a quantitatively sufficient (legal) workforce. 
Therefore, there would be a slim market for illegal immigration in effect decreasing 
illegal entrance and the numbers of aliens exposed to the dangers of entering the U.S. 
illegally. 
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They believed the registry would add stability to this legal workforce. The 
registry would be highly efficient and modem in connecting agricultural employers with 
potential employees. The SOL's search of the registry would eliminate inefficient, 
ineffective, and costly market tests and employer advertising required under the existing 
H-2A program. 
Proponents also suggested that the worker guarantees in Title III of the bill were 
also of better quality than those established by the existing H-2A program. They boasted 
that with this bill, worker protections would increase (mainly through MSA WPA 
coverage not realized before) while a new more affordable prevailing wage would be 
established that would still offer employees a premium wage. Moreover, the acceptable 
guarantees from the original H-2A program would be unchanged by the bill, and those 
changed do not decrease the benefits to the employees (e.g. the new housing allowance 
would not decrease living standards). 
Opponents of AgJobs '99 ('00), namely farm labor advocates and immigrant 
organizations, disagreed with these claims, however. Their opposition does not come 
from the argument that the existing H-2A program is already adequately securing descent 
wages, working conditions, and benefits for domestic and foreign workers in the U.S. and 
therefore reform is not needed. These groups, rather, feel that the current H-2A program 
is inadequate and should be improved. However, they felt tl:><::'t the reforms offered in the 
AgJobs bills did not meet worker and quite possibly could make things worse for 
agricultural workers. 
Opponents first stated that the wages offered in the current H-2A program do not 
match the wage increases witnessed in other industries and and do not move agricultural 
workers above the poverty line. Referring to the NA WS 1997-1998 and the review of the 
H-2A program conducted by the U.S. GAO done in December 1997*+, the opponents of 
the AgJobs bills supported their argument with data showing that in the ten year period 
beginning in 1989, farm wages had only increased 18% in nominal terms compared to an 
average 32% nominal increase in non-agricultural wages. In real terms, farm wages have 
actually decreased 11%. This, the opponents stated, is the explanation for why the 
NA WS 1997-1998 reported that 61% of farm workers are below the poverty line. 
Therefore, they stated that no reform should be supported that could further decrease the 
income of farm workers. 
Opponents to the AgJobs bills also expressed opposition to the working 
conditions and benefits offered by the bills. First, they claimed that the proposed housing 
allowance would put another unnecessary burden on agricultural workers eligible for the 
benefit with the possibility of only being able to acquire substandard housing with the 
allowance. Next, the opposition claimed that some of the other working conditions and 
benefits offered in AgJobs were written more vaguely than in the original H-2A program. 
They specifically commented on the meals and tools guarantee of the H-2A program that 
was neglected in the reform bill. They correctly expressed concern and fear that this 
vagueness and neglect could lead to further exploitation of agricultural workers by their 
• See Farm Labor Statistics in Part II 
+Opponents to the AgJobs bills and the AOA bill, to be discussed next, consistently refer to these two 
pieces of literature. 
employers through unnecessary fees for these items. Therefore, William Buchanan IV, 
President of the American Council for Immigration Reform, stated that for any reform 
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bill to be supported, the guarantees offered in the bill must improve those of the original 
H-2A program optimally equal to those of other visa programs. Furthermore, Cecilia 
Munoz, Vice President of the Office of Research Advocacy and Legislation for the 
National Council of La Raza, predicted that this reform bill would decrease the economic 
and political power of agricultural workers at large. She argued that this economic and 
political power of farm workers is already quite weak not unlike their situation during the 
Bracero program (e.g. hindrance of unionization because of farm labor market saturation). 
The opposition to the AgJobs bills by these organizations was not limited to 
wages, working conditions, and benefits. Opponents also expressed concern for the 
streamlining of the H-2A program allowing agricultural employers to more easily acquire 
immigrant temporary employees. Opponents already felt that perhaps the H-2A program 
is unnecessary. This argument stems from the 1997 GAO finding that there is an extreme 
over supply of farm labor in the U.S. and there is unlikely to be a shortage in the near 
future. The GAO report found that 13/20 of the large agricultural employing counties in 
the U.S. had annual double-digit unemployment in 1997 (see Table 7). Also, in June 
1997 the GAO reported that 11 of these 20 counties had unemployment equal to double 
that of the national average (5.2% June 1997). In other words, extreme unemployment 
rates existed even during peak periods of agricultural employment. Analyzing these data, 
opponents of the AgJobs bills predicted that passage of either of these bills would only 
add to the surplus of labor and therefore unemployment. 
Table 7- June 1997 Unemployment Rates for 20 Counties With High Agricultural 
Employment* 
County 
Fresno County, Calif. 
Imperial Conuty, Calif. 
Kern County, Calif. 
Madera County, Calif. 
Merced County, Calif. 
Monterey County, Calif. 
Riverside County, Calif. 
San Diego County, Calif. 
San Joaquin County, Calif. 
Santa Barbara County, Calif. 
Stanislaus County, Calif. 
Tulare Country,Calif. 
Ventura Counrty, Calif. 
Collier Countu, Fla. 
Dade County, Fla. 
Hendry County, Fla. 
Palm Beach County, Fla. 
St. Lucie County, Fla. 
Yuma County, Ariz. 
Yakima County, Wash. 
• Adapted from GAO '97 
June 1997 Unemployment Rate 
12.4 
24.6 
11.4 
13.4 
14.1 
7.2 
7.2 
4.4 
10.8 
4.1 
13.5 
13.9 
5.9 
5.9 
7.8 
19.5 
6.9 
11.6 
32.7 
8.1 
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State 
California 6.3 
Florida 5.2 
Arizona 4.9 
Washington 4.7 
Country 
United States 5.2 
Opponents also believed that a continuing increase in the surplus of labor would 
have more detrimental effects than just rising unemployment. An increasing surplus 
would, as seen during the Bracero program, help to decrease employee wages, working 
conditions, and benefits and ensure that they remain low to the benefit of employers. 
Also, the sheer increase to the population in high agricultura1 employment areas, because 
it is unneeded in terms of filling jobs, would only increase the overcrowding of schools in 
these areas (leading to an overall decrease in the education of the students) and urban 
sprawl which creates problems of its own. Furthermore, as Mark Krikorian, the 
Executive Director for the Center of Immigration Studies, eloquently projects, an 
oversupply of labor working for low wages will actually decrease farm productivity and 
competitiveness in the long run. A surplus of low paid labor, he claims, leads to 
inefficient production in that the surplus (again, as seen in the Bracero program) hinders 
the incentive to develop better and more efficient technology which historically has given 
U.S. producers advantages in the world market. In this view, to ensure the natural 
development of improving technology, the labor surplus in the agricultural industry needs 
to be curbed which most likely begins with the dismantling of agricultural foreign worker 
programs (i.e. the H-2A program) and the halting of illegal immigration. 
Despite these concerns, reform advocates hoped that the amnesty provision would 
buy them a passage of AgJobs. Opponents, even though most support an amnesty, had 
problems with this part of the bill as well. Their main argument was against the 
requirements that undocumented workers would have to meet to be eligible for the 
adjustment of legal status. Opponents felt that the requirements would be very expensive 
and in effect would result in indentured servitude of the illegals desiring adjustment. 
They also remarked that it would be highly impractical for an illegal alien to produce 
authentic records showing completion of the work requirements. It would also be very 
cumbersome to keep these records. In addition, many employers might not have kept 
these records for their known illegal employees out of fear of discovery of illegal 
employment. 
The main government opposition to the AgJobs bills came from the amnesty 
provision as well. Many Congressional conservatives outright oppose amnesty out of 
personal conviction, concern for the effects of an amnesty on the U.S. economy, and/ or 
the correlation between granting amnesty and increased illegal immigration after such an 
adjustment of status as seen after the 1986 amnesty. 
In conclusion, the proponents of the AgJobs bills discovered that many opponents 
not only opposed their proposed reforms but also questioned the acceptability of the 
existing H-2A program. The reformers had hoped that the amnesty provision alone 
would establish a compromise between the conflicting parties and secure passage of 
either bill. However, the amnesty advocates would not acce; t the conditions for amnesty 
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and some congressional members opposed any amnesty. Therefore, both AgJobs '99 and 
AgJobs '00 died in. The last major action of AgJobs '00 (H.R.4056) occurred in a House 
subcommittee on March 3, 2000. Likewise, the last major action for AgJobs '99 (S.l814) 
occurred in Senate subcommittees on May 4, 2000. 
Agricultural Opportunities Act (AOA) 
Despite the failure of both AgJobs bills by early May 2000, the agricultural 
employer organizations and their Congressional supporters introduced a somewhat 
similar bill in the House on May 25, 2000. This bill, introdu~ed by Rep. Richard Pombo, 
was titled the Agricultural Opportunities Act (H.R.4548). The purpose of the bill was "to 
establish a pilot program creating a system of registries of temporary agricultural workers 
to provide for a sufficient supply of workers, to amend the INA to streamline procedures 
for the temporary admission and extension of stay of nonimmigrant agricultural workers 
under the pilot program, and other purposes". Title I of AOA was similar to Title II of 
the AgJobs bills. It calls for the Secretary of Labor to establish and run a system of 
databases containing eligible U.S. workers with their employment status that wish to be 
employed within the agricultural industry. Similar to AgJobs, the principle goals for this 
registry were to ensure that eligible U.S. workers know about job opportunities in 
agriculture, have priority in obtaining the jobs, and are referred to these job opportunities 
in a timely manner. Likewise, any eligible worker in the U.S. would be able to apply. 
With the AgJobs registry, an employer could not have an H-2A employee approved 
without applying to the SOL to search the registry in the respective state of the employer 
for potential registrant (U.S. worker priority) workers. In the AOA, alternatively, Title I 
would add Section 218A to the INA stating that employers could not have H-2C 
employees approved unless the registry is searched in the same fashion. H-2C employees 
would be those nonimmigrant employees hired under the H-2C program. 
Title II of AOA creates this H-2C pilot program by amending SectionlOl 
(a)(l5)(H)(ii) of the INA. Similar to the H-2A program and its potential changes offered 
in the dead AgJobs bills, aliens would be admitted under this program if they have not 
violated the H-2C program or U.S. law in the last 5 years. Those admitted could reside in 
the U.S. only for the period granted by the visa, and would receive an ID and 
employment eligibility document (the ID system seen in AgJobs) besides the visa. 
Provisions of this new program are once again nearly identical to that of the 
existing H-2A program and its hopeful reforms in the AgJobs bills. For example, 
employers could not obtain H-2C employees if the job opening is the result of a strike or 
lockout, employers could not refuse registry referrals (if they are qualified), and 
employers would have to post items advertising the registry in the workplace if he or she 
uses the registry. Likewise, an employer could apply as late as 28 days before the need, 
the SOL would have seven days to accept or deny the application, the SOL would have to 
begin an immediate search of the registry after acceptance, the search must be completed 
by seven days before the need, and H-2C employees would only be admitted to fill those 
jobs the registry could not. In effect, the eligibility for H-2C workers, the registry search, 
registry referrals, and the issuance of visas is basically equal under the AOA and the 
AgJobs bills. In reality, the only difference is that AOA establishes a "different" program 
labeled H-2C as opposed to H-2A. 
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Not surprisingly, then, the employer requirements (employee guarantees) 
enumerated in Title II of AOA are nearly the same as those under Title III of AgJobs 
'99('00) including the eligibility for employers to request a unique prevailing wage 
calculation for their respective area of the state, the housing allowance option (and its 
amount), and the transportation reimbursement. However, it must be noted that the 
AgJobs bills were a direct reform of the H-2A program. The AOA was not. This bill 
would have established an entirely new temporary agricultural worker program (H-2C). 
Therefore, if one of the AgJobs bills had passed, the employer requirements not 
mentioned by AgJobs that are listed under the H-2A program would still have been in 
effect. Since AOA fails to enumerate the employer requirements of the H-2A program 
except for the ones the bill tried to reform, those unlisted H-2A requirements would not 
be guaranteed under the new H-2C program if passed. A final note must also be made 
that the AOA did not originally contain an amnesty provision like Title I (S.1518) of the 
AgJobs bills. 
Opinions Concerning the AOA 
Like the AgJobs bills, AOA supporters believed that the registry under this bill 
would solve many of the problems caused by the H-2A program. The employer 
requirements to use the registry to obtain U.S. or H-2C workers would be cheaper, more 
efficient, and much quicker in finding willing, able, and qualified workers allowing 
employers to request workers closer to the date of need (and therefore more accurately). 
The intent was to create a simple program with less bureaucn~cy. Therefore, supporters 
believed the registry under this bill would establish a legal, stable workforce while 
securing priority and better protections for U.S. workers. They felt alien agricultural 
workers would also benefit through easier attainment of temporary visas (H-2C visas in 
this case). All workers, they claimed, would also receive good wages, and allow more 
employers to participate by eliminating the fixed costs of onsite housing and eliminating 
the "not in my backyard" opposition by neighbors of the worksite with the housing 
allowance. AOA supporters envisioned that the efficient use of this program would 
discourage illegal immigration and therefore reduce the number of individuals who are 
exposed to the dangers of crossing the U.S. border and working illegally. 
However, opponents of this type of reform quickly united against AOA just as 
with the AgJobs before it. They stated that giving SOL only 14 days to find enough 
willing, able, and ready U.S. workers through the registry is inadequate time. Also, they 
argued that the registry would excuse employers from actively recruiting workers and 
permit them to refuse to hire U.S. workers who were not in the registry. These factors, 
opponents said, contradict the assumption of U.S. worker priority. 
Opponents also attacked the employer requirements in much the same way they 
attacked those under AgJobs. The elimination of an AEWR ;~nd the implementation of a 
'to-be-determined' prevailing wage for the H-2C program would only ensure lower 
wages than those offered in the H-2A program (which are already low). Likewise, the 
option for a housing allowance would decrease living standards below the H-2A program 
standards. 
These opponents also criticized any reform that, according to their arguments, 
would easily increase the number of agricultural workers in the U.S. As with the AgJobs 
bills, opponents referred to the NAWS 1997-1998 and GAO December 1997 findings 
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that reported that there is already a surplus of agricultural labor in the U.S. causing the 
fall of farm wages in real terms, extreme underemployment, <! decrease in weeks worked, 
an increase of farm workers below the poverty line, and decreased unionization*. 
Opponents claimed that the passage of the AOA would not only exasperate these 
problems but also would increase the problems of overcrowded schools, urban sprawl, 
and the suppression of agricultural technology development. In their final argument 
against the AOA, opponents presented the argument that an increase in nonimmigrant 
workers in the U.S. (as possible through this bill) would establish more U.S. connections 
for Mexicans that in turn would lead to increased illegal immigration. 
Therefore, opponents felt that the AOA would actually suppress and decrease 
worker protections, wages, and working conditions, while increasing illegal immigration. 
And finally, it failed to include the appealing amnesty provision. Wishing to avoid the 
fate of the AgJobs bills, the AOA advocates teamed up with worker advocates, and the 
government to amend the AOA so it could pass before Congress let out in December 
2000. The three groups eventually found a consensus to a greatly amended AOA bill. 
The significantly amended AOA, now including an amnesty provision, was then 
reintroduced to Congress. 
Despite the new amnesty provision (which helped kill the AgJobs bill) there was 
great optimism that the bill would pass before the end of the Congressional session. 
Opposition against the amended bill came late and unsuspected, however. Senate 
Majority Leader Trent Lott, previously believed to be a supporter of the amended AOA, 
disallowed the bill to be filed. This killed the bill and concealed exactly what the 
amended bill actually contained except to those who helped write the amendments. 
The late action of Senate Majority Leader Lott was a result of the opposition to 
the amnesty from President Bill Clinton and conservative members of Congress. Sen. 
Phil Gramm, heading the conservative congressmen opposing amnesty, stated that he 
wanted to avoid the repercussions of an amnesty like those seen in 1986 and that he or his 
colleagues would never support any reform bill with an amnesty provision. 
Other Reform 
The discussion of H-2A reform until this point has been concerned with the 
reforms most employers and employer organizations have desired as well as the bills they 
have tried to push through Congress. However, it should not be assumed that the 
opponents to the AgJobs bills and the AOA feel that the current H-2A program caters to 
their desires and should not be reformed. Many of these opponents think the H-2A 
program needs reforming too although differently than that presented in the previously 
discussed bills. In fact, there are some organizations, like the National Council of La 
Raza (NCLR), that desire outright dismantling of the H-2A program. At this time, it is 
quite impractical for NCLR to gain support for their position. However, organizations 
like NCLR and other groups (like labor and immigration organizations) have outlined 
various recommendations for reform in what they believe will improve the operation of 
the program. 
First and foremost, these groups promote more effective enforcement of U.S. and 
foreign worker protections under the program and U.S. labor law in general. Too many 
agricultural laborers do not receive certain guarantees due to employer exploitation or 
• Refer to Opinions Concerning AgJobs '99 ('00) 
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ignorance. Currently, the government is not committed enough in enforcing the law and 
agricultural workers do not have sufficient economic and political power to collect the 
guarantees owed to them. 
The next recommendation concerns the attractiveness of agricultural jobs. These 
groups state that increasing the accessibility to foreign workers is not the correct 
approach to securing adequate labor if there is indeed a farm labor shortage.* They 
believe the correct approach would be to make agricultural jobs more attractive to U.S. 
workers. This could be accomplished through employers offering higher wages, more 
benefits, better working conditions, and! or longer working periods. This would 
encourage more laborers to work in the agricultural industry especially those U.S. 
citizens who are unemployed and! or on welfare. 
Along the same lines, these groups are calling for an improvement in the existing 
recruiting methods of U.S. workers for agricultural jobs. Like improving the 
attractiveness of agricultural jobs, better recruiting methods would allow farm employers 
to effectively acquire U.S. workers for most of their job open:ngs in a timely manner. 
The DOL coordinating with labor organizations and supplying additional government 
funds to AgNet+ could also aid in connecting workers to agricultural employers 
effectively. Finally, a system of transportation for U.S. workers to help get them to the 
employer's worksite would improve getting workers to the work-site by the day of need. 
The U.S. government has also issued recommendations in for H-2A reform. The 
most notable examples are the December 1997 recommendations offered by the GAO. 
The first GOA recommendation is to decrease the 60 day before need deadline for 
employers' H-2A applications to 45 days before the need. This could be accomplished 
by eliminating the INS verification of potential H-2A employees. The check is 
unnecessary and can add as much as three weeks in the application verification process. 
The Secretary of Labor can accomplish this task without sending the list of H-2A 
employees to the INS. Implementing this recommendation would decrease the 
bureaucracy associated with the program and speed up the verification process. 
Therefore, employers could file for H-2A employees closer to the need and more 
accurately calculate the workers they truly need. 
The GAO also recommends that the% guarantee of tL~ program be revised. As 
previously mentioned the GAO discovered in its December 1997 report that many H-2A 
workers who are eligible for the guarantee were not receiving the funds owed to them. 
This was because employers do not have to pay the % guarantee until after the work 
period ends. Yet, H-2A workers are required to leave the country immediately after the 
work period ends. Obviously, this results in some H-2A employees not receiving the 
guaranteed money. 
DOL Response to Recommendations 
The DOL has not been idle during the many sided H-2A reform debate. The 
department has made some improvements to the program in response to the 
recommendations and reforms proposed. The Employment and Training Administration 
• Refer to Opinions Concerning the Aglobs '99 ('00)1 AOA 
+ AgNet is a database registry with the purpose of connecting agricultural employers with U.S. workers. 
However, this particular system is regarded as out of date in respect to technology and methodology and is 
therefore quite ineffective. 
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(ETA) of the DOL, for example, heeded the GAO recommendation of changing the 
employer-filing deadline from 60 to 45 days before the need. Much less pertinent to the 
H-2A reform debate, the ETA also ruled that the inspection of employer provided 
housing could be conducted as late as 20 days before the arrival of the employer's 
workers that will be living in the housing. The ETA made other changes to the program 
including the modification of the requirement that employers must notify, in writing, the 
local State Employment Office of the exact date on which H-2A workers depart for the 
worksite, and proposed the change of transferring the adjudication authority concerning 
visa petitions for foreign workers from the INS to the DOL. These changes and 
proposals went into effect on July 29, 1999. On March 26, 2001, the DOL also 
acknowledged the employer complaints concerning the calcu:ation of the AEWR and 
ruled to review the fairness and accuracy of the computation of the AEWR. The issuing 
of the 2001 AEWRs were, therefore, delayed for 60 days but have since been released. 
Finally, in April of this year the ETA stated that State Employment Service Agencies 
(SESA) would be established in each U.S. state for the reviewing and processing of H-2A 
applications. This is a decentralization from a centralized federal location. The ETA, 
again, hopes this action will help decrease H-2A application processing time. The SESA 
in Ohio can be reached at: 
Ohio Dept. of Jobs & Family Services 
145 Front St. 
Columbus, OH 
Phone: ( 614) 644- 7288 
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PARTIV-CURRENTISSUES 
Mexico, the U.S., and U.S. Immigration Policy. 
Despite the changes within the H-2A Temporary Agricultural Worker Program by 
the DOL, the program is still viewed as highly inadequate. One can postulate that these 
changes are only prolonging the inevitable: the passage of a large reform bill or the 
creation of an entirely new program. 
There has been much recent talk between new presidents George W. Bush and 
Vicente Fox, of the U.S. and Mexico respectively, concerning the establishment of new 
U.S. immigration policy, including a new guestworker program, constructed under the 
guidance of both governments in the near future. Both presidents agree that something 
must be done to improve the current U.S. immigration policy and see this improvement 
as a key opportunity to better relations between the two nations. 
Because of this, President Bush appears to be open to a new guestworker program 
and has promised reform of U.S. immigration policy but still seems quite unsure what 
either of these should entail or whom it will ultimately benefit. President Fox has been 
hastily pushing U.S. immigration reform in the fear that the U.S. economy may continue 
to slow down signifying less available jobs or room in the labor market for loaned 
Mexican labor. Presently, Mexico may need to create as many as 1.3 million new jobs a 
year to match its constantly increasing labor force*. Given this, the delay of immigration 
reform in a slowing U.S. economy (which may ultimately nullify any reform to increase 
the entrance of legal Mexican labor) could have detrimental effects on the Mexican 
economy. This would be especially true if the U.S. increased its efforts to thwart illegal 
immigration corning from Mexico. 
Many are optimistic, however, that the U.S. and Mexican governments will 
establish appropriate reform to U.S. immigration policy in a timely manner. Since the 
turn of the new year, many U.S. and Mexican officials have been scheduling and holding 
various meetings to discuss what should be done about U.S. immigration policy and what 
should be included in the possible creation of a new guestworker program between the 
two nations. Some of the more influential officials engaged in these talks have been U.S. 
Attorney General Jon Ashcroft, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Mexican Foreign 
Minister Jorge Castaoeda, Mexican Interior Minister Santiago Creel, and Mexican 
General Rafael Macedo de Ia Concha. Secretary of State Powell and Attorney General 
Ashcroft have released a joint statement stating that, besides the work on a new 
guestworker program, the meetings with Mexico will focus on ideas of legalizing 
undocumented Mexicans in the U.S., border safety, the rights of U.S. employees, and 
cooperative labor enforcement. 
The possible legalization of illegals has been given special attention and concern 
by those officials working on a new guest worker program. The Mexican side of the 
talks has lobbied very hard for the adjustment of status, especially from Presidente Fox. 
He recently was quoted saying, "I would like to work ... toward ... getting an amnesty for 
those (Mexicans) who are in the United States, who are servicing the U.S. economy, who 
are servicing the country even if they are legal or illegal." Within the U.S. borders, 
Latino and many religious leaders contend that Congress should approve a legalization 
• Millman, Joel. "California Growers Ask U.S. to Admit Mexican 'Guest' Labor." The Wall Street Journal. 
12 Feb. 2001. 
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provision for undocumented workers before creating any new guest-worker. In other 
words, these groups believe the consequence(s) of the failed H-2A program must be dealt 
with before hastily jumping into another guest worker progra_n. "You have to legalize 
people here first, before you bring more people in from abroad," says J. Kevin Appleby, 
director of migration and refugee policy for the United States Conference of Catholics 
and Bishops. 
Aids to President Bush are actually urging the President to back some sort of 
adjustment of status provision. Its passage would not only please the Mexican 
government bringing the two countries closer together but would please the U.S. Latino 
community. Thinking ahead to the presidential election in 2004, President Bush knows 
he will need the votes from this large minority group. 
The White House announced that it would back a legalization provision but not a 
blanket amnesty. President Bush and his aids envision an adjustment of status occurring 
over a few years in which qualification criteria would include employment records, 
family ties, and the number of years residing in the U.S.* Despite many Democrats and 
immigration groups clamoring for the adjustment of all undocumented workers, Secretary 
of State Powell and Attorney General Ashcroft are currently stating that only 
undocumented Mexicans would be given the adjustment opportunity at first. 
Furthermore, the White House has also said that any adjustmt>,nt provision would be a 
part of a broader guest-worker agreement, which it will closely work on with Congress 
and Mexico. The scheduled immigration talks in September 2001 between presidents 
Bush and Fox are extremely influential to the content of any future guest worker/ 
legalization legislation. 
Challenges 
As with the AOA bill killed in December 2000, there is much conservative 
resistance to any legalization provision (immediate adjustment or not) to be proposed in 
the near future. The Federation for American Immigration Reform, for example, has 
spent $500,000 in advertisements condemning any new U.S. agreement with Mexico that 
would include an adjustment of status+. Sen. Phil Gramm of Texas, the conservative 
Congressman who blocked the passage of the AOA in 2000 because of its legalization 
provision, is again speaking out against any amnesty condemning the legalization talks 
between the U.S. and Mexico. Sen. Gramm and his conservative allies have promised 
that any amnesty or version of such will never pass in Congress. Furthermore, the 
reaction to the recent terrorist attacks (especially in respect to the increase of immigration 
enforcement) will undoubtedly postpone any amnesty agreement. 
Unlikely Involvement 
Despite Sen. Gramm's blunt opposition to the legalization of millions of illegal 
workers, he is not frowning upon other measures to improve the illegal situation. Often 
construed as an enemy to illegal Mexican immigration because of his resistance to 
amnesty, Sen. Gramm has recently admitted that the country must face the reality that 
there are illegal laborers in the U.S. and that the U.S. economy is dependent upon these 
• Qualifications similar to those seen under AOA in 2000. 
+Schmitt, Eric. "Bush Aids Weigh Legalization Status of Mexicans in U.S." The New York Times. 15 Jul. 
01. 
illegal workers. He has also commented that now is the opportune time to shift the 
treatment of all Mexican workers from that of abuse to protection. In his opinion, this 
can be accomplished through the establishment a new, effective guest-worker program, 
not an amnesty, where the only Mexican laborers in the U.S. are legal guest-workers 
whose rights and livelihoods are protected. Gramm says the work on such a program 
would simply "unite the U.S. and Mexico." 
Gramm's Proposal 
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Now more than just an outspoken supporter of immigration policy reform and a 
new guest-worker program, Sen. Gramm is currently working diligently in creating such 
a new program. The following are currently the key points to Gramm's guestworker 
program proposal: 
• Participation in the program will be granted to adults for annual or seasonal labor on a 
year-by-year extension policy. 
• Seasonal guestworkers who return to Mexico each year will be able to receive 
indefinite annual permit renewals. 
• Those guestworkers who remain (legally by the permits) in the U.S. for the entire 
year may stay in the U.S. for up to three years but must return to Mexico after this 
period for at least a year before reapplying for a permit. 
• Undocumented workers working illegally in the U.S. will have 6 months to apply for 
the program without fear of penalty and will automatically be accepted. 
• Mexico will hold their own eligibility standards as well. 
• Unique ID cards will be established for the program. 
• There will be no limit as to the type of job a guestworker admitted through this 
program may perform. 
• The DOL will apply the housing, working, and wage and hour labor laws for the 
program. Violators of these DOL regulations will be punished as if they had violated 
U.S. worker guarantees and will receive a ten-year debarment from the program. 
• Employers must show a good-faith effort in recruiting U.S. workers. 
• Guestworkers will receive all the same rights and privileges as all other workers. 
• Penalties will be increased and enforcement will be heightened against those who 
continue to hire illegal employees after the inception of the program. 
• The number accepted annually will be determined separately in each of 12 Federal 
Reserve Districts. The groups making these decisions within these districts will be 
composed of commissions of employer representatives, labor unions, and the federal 
government. 
• This program will first only be established between the U.S. and Mexico. 
• The permits granted under this program will not lead to the possibility of permanent 
residency status. All guestworkers must leave the U.S. when the contract period has 
been completed. 
As previously mentioned, there have been many meetings and discussions 
between the foreign relations committees of Mexico and the U.S. concerning change in 
immigration policy. Sen. Gramm also has participated in discussions with Mexico and 
Presidente Fox. He and his four foremost supporting members of the Senate (Pete 
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Domenici (R) of New Mexico, Zell Miller (D) of Georgia, Jim Bumming (R) of 
Kentucky, and Mike Crapo (R) of Idaho) began meeting with Presidente Fox for talks 
about a new guestworker program in January 2001. However, it is still too early too tell 
when such a program would be brought before Congress for approval, when a consensus 
amongst its framers will be reach as to what exactly should be enumerated under the 
program, and whether President Bush and Presidente Fox will support Sen. Gramm's 
proposal without a legalization provision. Furthermore, there is domestic opposition to 
Sen. Gramm's new program that will undoubtedly make the passage of such a program 
extremely difficult before the end of 2001. 
Opposition to President Bush and Sen. Gramm 
Domestic opposition to Sen. Gramm's new guest-worker program proposal begins, 
not surprisingly, with U.S. labor unions and immigration advocacy groups. First, 
immigration experts have asserted that there has been little dialogue between the federal 
government and these unions or groups concerning a new guestworker program. More 
specifically, Cecilia Munoz, Vice President of the National Council of La Raza, has 
stated that President Bush has not spoken of the injustices in the current immigration law 
and the H-2A program that need to be corrected in a new program and immigration 
policy. Mark Krikorian, Executive Director of the Center for Immigration Studies, has 
also condemned the Bush administration because the cabinet does not contain an official 
on immigration and, therefore, the White House is ignorant to what should be done to 
improve U.S. immigration policy. Bruce Goldstein, co- director of the Farmworker 
Justice Fund, Inc. calls Sen. Gramm's proposal "worse than the Bracero Program" and 
claims that guestworkers will be "given status where they can't protect their rights." The 
entire Farmworker Justice Fund is condemning the Texas Senator's proposal as a 
program equal to indentured servitude. 
Thus organized labor, in general, is not backing the S('.nator. These groups and 
their supporters, just as with the reform bills discussed previously, fear that the new 
guestworker program Sen. Gramm wishes to establish will be ineffective on a large scale, 
will lead to a second class caste in the U.S., will not protect the human rights of 
guestworkers, will make guestworkers vulnerable to exploitation (because of only a one 
year work period), and finally, as Sidney Weintraub from the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies in Washington postulates, will not hinder illegal immigration but 
mostly encourage it. 
Sen. Graham, co- designer of the AOA reform bill, is also not supporting Sen. 
Gramm. Sen. Graham, who had his AOA bill blocked by Sen. Gramm in December 2000, 
argues that Sen. Gramm's program outline is not a true reform of immigration law and 
will highly resemble the current H-2A program and, therefore, will encounter many 
similar problems. Sen. Graham also criticizes the proposal because it does not contain an 
adjustment of status to legal residency provision, it will increase the fines to employers 
who hire illegal workers, and it will be useless to those employers who hire guestworkers 
from the Caribbean and Central America. 
Despite the talks between the two parties, a stronger barrier to Sen. Gramm's 
ideal guestworker program could be, in fact, Presidente Fox ~· imself who has dreamed of 
an 'open-borders' state between the U.S. and Mexico through the change of U.S. policy 
and a blanket amnesty for his citizens illegally working in the U.S. This amnesty could 
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legalize as many as 6 million illegal Mexican laborers, a figure double the number of 
illegals forgiven in the 1986 amnesty. This strikes fear in many U.S. lawmakers' eyes. 
These Congressional members frown on Fox's 'open-borders' proposal as a method of 
introducing an overabundance of Mexicans into the U.S. economy with damaging 
consequences. Also, many lawmakers, lead by Sen. Gramm himself, are very avidly 
against an amnesty as they feel an amnesty only rewards lawbreakers and encourages 
more illegal immigration. Sen. Gramm believes that econorr.i::: freedom and increased 
opportunity in Mexico is the only answer to halting illegal immigration, not an amnesty. 
This inability for the two parties to see eye-to-eye on t~e legalization issue could further 
impede the introduction of Sen. Gramm's proposal to ~ongress. 
Current Domestic Reform 
Despite the hype of the negotiations between tqe U.S. and Mexican governments 
concerning changes to U.S. immigration policy and Sef1ator Gramm's ideal guest-worker 
program, there have been various bills introduced in C~ngress this summer to reform the 
H-2A program. The first of these bills is the latest Ag OBS bill (S.ll61) introduced by 
Sen. Larry E. Craig (R) of Idaho. This is an H-2A re£ rm bill with two principal 
elements. First, it contains a section giving undocumented, illegal workers the 
opportunity to adjust to legal status with proof of working a certain number of days and 
hours over past specified seasons. Second, it containsJ.· provision for the streamlining of 
the H-2A program. Rep. Howard L. Berman (D) of C lifornia and Sen. Ted Kennedy (D) 
of Massachusetts each have introduced a more liberal ersion of this most recent 
AgJOBS bill in their respective Houses listed as H.R. 2736 and S.l313 respectively. 
These AgJOBS bills are extremely similar to their preaecessors. However, many 
are optimistic that this version will escape the fate of the ones before it. Sen. Gramm, the 
White House, and the others within the U.S. government, who blocked the passage of the 
AOA bill last December because of its amnesty provision, have again stated that they will 
not support a bill will an adjustment of status provision (viewed, as a veiled amnesty) and 
will exercise what power they can to block the passage of this updated version. However, 
Sen. Gramm was aided in his blockage of last year's AOA bill because it was introduced 
so late in the Congressional session. Supporters of the new AgJOBS bills believe that if 
an agreement on what exactly the bills will contain can be reached early enough within 
this Congressional session, neither Sen. Gramm nor any other congressional member will 
be able to block its passage assuming sufficient support outside the amnesty issue. 
Therefore, the key to the passage of one of these AgJOBS bills in the 107th 
Congress is a timely agreement upon its contents. Yet, there still exists a debate between 
employers and worker advocacy groups upon certain points within the bills, especially 
concerning the wage requirement. Employers wish to erase the AEWR and simply 
instate a "prevailing wage" wage requirement (which would be substantially lower than 
the AEWR) while worker advocacy groups obviously are art·Jing for the highest wage 
possible for the laborers. Despite the controversy, however, both employers and work 
advocacy groups are confident that a compromise will soon be reached and, therefore, an 
AgJOBS bill streamlining the H-2A program and offering an adjustment of status to 
illegals will be past before the end of 2001. 
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PART V ·IMMIGRATION : A MEXICAN PERSPECTIVE 
Until this point, this work has specifically focused on U.S. political and economic 
history, policies, legislation, and problems in respect to the H-2A Temporary Agricultural 
Worker Program and immigration into the U.S. Like the majority of the U.S. political, 
and organizational participants in this issue, this work's U.S. paradigm has been 
exclusively one-sided to the U.S. perspective. However, despite the U.S. being the host 
for the H-2A program and possessing a stronger economy, it can not be ignored that 
Mexico, its history, its economy, and its perspective on immigration is just as important 
in understanding those laborers who come to the U.S. for work, and thus understanding 
what ethically should be done in respect to illegal immigration and in the creating of a 
new guest-worker program. 
In respect to the U.S. perspective throughout history, Americans have always 
assumed that the majority of the Mexican labor force has been chronically poor and 
desperate for American jobs. Through its superiority complex, American society 
presumes that its hands are clean of the past Mexican economic instability, and that all 
Mexicans wish to come to the great northern nation, which obviously must be first-class 
to theirs. It is this shortsightedness that leads the U.S. to believe that it is able to acquire 
Mexican labor at will, that labor exploitation is somewhat justit1ed, that we can treat all 
immigrants as if faceless, and that it can establish immigratio11 programs with inadequate 
foreign worker protections. These assumptions, in part, have helped lead to the consistent 
framing of shortsighted, inadequate immigration programs including H-2A. 
Historical Causes of Mexican Inunigration to the U.S. 
The history of Mexican immigration begins in the mid-191h century when Mexico 
was still in possession of the large northern territory now known as the southwest United 
States (California, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Nevada, and Texas). The Mexican 
government, headed by the caudillo Gen. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, encouraged the 
settlement of this area by its citizens and even U.S. citizens (Texas specifically) as this 
region was sparsely populated. The settlement of U.S. citizens in the Texas region 
eventually led to an independence movement (incited by U.S. foreign policy) and the 
establishing of Texas as a separate nation. After its independence, the U.S. eagerly 
annexed the newborn nation despite war threats from Santa Anna's regime in 1847. The 
U.S. won the ensuing war and, as a consequence, kept Texas and stole (remember this a 
Mexican perspective) the remainder of Mexico's northern territory (in other words, the 
U.S. continued its imperialism through territorial expansion). Immigration restrictions 
for Mexicans entering into this newly acquired territory soon followed. 
The second half of the 191h century, however, was marked by the extremely low 
immigration of Mexicans into this territory and the rest of the U.S. The country was busy 
internally, though, as the Mexican dictator Porfirio Diaz was actively developing the 
Mexican infrastructure (roads, railroads, etc.) and economy (spt:-cialization in primary 
commodities) using the U.S. as a modeL The development led to a small upper class 
with the majority of the wealth and a large but poor lower class. Latifundismo *especially 
hurt the large rural populations. Tensions built and eventually revolution broke out in 
• Latifundismo is the concept referring to the establishing of large agrarian estates typically owned by a few 
privileged members of society. 
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Mexico in 1910. Two of the leaders of the revolution were Pancho Villa and Emilio 
Zapata both representing the rural peoples and their demands for land reform. The 
Mexican Revolution was extremely violent and bloody sending many Mexican to the 
United States in search of refuge and food. This pattern continued after the revolution as 
Mexico, despite its Agrarian Reform in its new constitution, was economically in ruins. 
Immigration to the northern neighbor increased in 1917, as well, when the U.S. 
contracted Mexican labor to replace those sent to fight in Europe (some historians 
actually call this the First Bracero Agreement and the one mentioned previously as the 
second). Illegal immigration was also beginning to increase through this contractual 
opening of the borders. Now recognizing documented workers versus undocumented 
workers, the U.S. established the Border Patrol in 1921. However, the U.S. turned its 
back to the illegal immigration as the nation had an economical purpose for the illegal 
labor thereby (indirectly) encouraging it. When the Depression hit in 1929, the U.S. 
enacted a repatriation law deporting all illegal immigrants since they were no longer of 
any use in the American economy. 
The Depression brought about economic changes in Mexico as well. During the 
beginning of the 20th century, developing countries, like Mexico, were still specializing in 
primary commodities and were thus highly dependent on the developed, industrialized 
nations (U.S. and Western Europe) as a market for their raw materials and as a supplier of 
finished goods. Therefore, when the developed countries' economies crashed, so did the 
dependent economies linked to them. To prevent a repeat of the tragedy, a group of Latin 
American economists, known as the ceplistas *, promoted the implementation of the 
economic development model known as Import Substitution Industrialization (lSI). This 
model (implemented strongly from 1940 to 1970) was to transition the Mexican economy 
from one that produces primary commodities to an economy that produces finished 
products, again using the U.S. as a model, by establishing a domestic industrial base. As 
a result, Mexico would no longer be dependent upon the developed world's economies 
and, therefore, would not be vulnerable to another devastating depression. 
The implementation of this capitalistic industrial- development model in a semi-
socialist (at least in terms of agriculture) post- revolution Mexico resulted in dire 
consequences for the nation, especially for the campesinos (rural farmers). First, as Karl 
Marx explains in his law of population, the development or transition to a capitalistic, 
industrial society from a predominately agrarian one creates great regional disparities. 
As a result, there are to be great displacements of people to the points of development 
(industrial sectors) from the declining sectors of the economy (agriculture). Since 
Mexico at this time was predominantly a rural society based on agriculture, many 
campesinos were forced to migrate to the cities or to immigrate to the U.S. to find income. 
Second, because Mexico was starting from scratch in respect to industrialization, 
the infant industries were unable to compete abroad. Therefore, the Mexican government 
was forced to implement various policies to protect and stimulate its industrial sector. 
Unfortunately, the majority of these measures (the neolatifundismo, price ceilings for 
food produced in the countryside+) were at the cost of the campesinos. Therefore, this 
• The cepalistas, led by Rual Prebisch, were Latin American economists trained at the University of 
Chicago and were therefore heavily influenced by American capitalistic thought. 
+So that urban workers could buy food cheaper, their bosses could then pay them less, and ultimately the 
industry would be more profitable. 
economic decline of the Mexican countryside (in combination with Mexico's growing 
population due to its place in its respective demographic transition) resulted in a larger 
exodus to the cities and to the United States. 
The United States, encouraging Mexico's capitalistic endeavors, conveniently 
needed agricultural labor during its participation in World War II and thus employed 
income searching campesinos through the (Second) Bracero Program or illegally. 
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Despite the programs termination in 1964, many Mexicans were still hired by agricultural 
employers illegally throughout the U.S. Surprisingly, the Partido del Estado or PRI, the 
Mexican party in power from 1930 to 2000, was well aware of the exploitation of its 
citizens working in the American fields, especially those who were illegal. 
Unfortunately, like the U.S. government, the PRI played blind to the illegal 
immigration and the human rights violations by U.S. agricul.:.ral employers. The 
Bracero Program and illegal immigration to the U.S. was an extremely important "safety 
valve" for the PRI at the time. During this period (1950's to 1970's) the PRI continued to 
heavily promote lSI, which continued to remove job sources from the agrarian 
countryside. The young industries in the cities were not able to absorb all of the 
displaced campesinos. Because the U.S. economy was willing and able to absorb the 
labor, however, internal tension and possibly another Mexican agrarian revolution was 
prevented. Thus, the Mexican government did not want to "rock the boat" so it could 
continue with its capitalist industrial development. 
Despite governmental protections, Mexican domestic industry did not become 
competitive abroad. The domestic market, composed mainly of underpaid industrial 
workers and poor campesinos, was not sufficient to counter the products non-
competitiveness. The protection policies and financially supporting measures the 
Mexican government implemented on behalf of the industries eventually led to fiscal 
deficits, inflation, and large external debt. lSI implementation halted throughout all of 
Latin America when the Mexican government publicly announced that it could not 
continue repaying these debts. The ensuing debt crisis (The Debt Crisis of 1982) forced 
all world creditors to stop the easy lending of petro-dollars to Latin America and the 
countries therein were no longer able to finance their large government spending to keep 
lSI afloat. Restructuring of the Mexican economy began in the 1980's but not without 
dependency upon high capital nations like the U.S. Illegal immigration continued 
throughout the 1980's and was not decelerated by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1986 despite its amnesty and the H-2A Temporary Agricultural Worker Program. 
Personal Motives"' to Mexican Immigration 
Undoubtedly, economical causes initiated the Mexican immigration of 
campesinos to the U.S. since they were without work, land, and, therefore, without 
income for food. However, to say that an insufficient economy is the only cause or 
perhaps even the main cause of Mexicans crossing the frontier would be inaccurate. 
Although many Americans still assume that Mexican laborers come to the U.S. because 
there is no other option, the current trend is that more and more of the Mexican 
temporary workers, legal and illegal alike, are satisfactorily employed in their home 
country. 
• Here I will use 'motives' to denote micro- personal reasons for immigrating to the U.S. as opposed to 
'causes' used above to denote macro- structural (economic) reasons. 
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No later than the beginning of the (Second) Bracero Program, a strong 
dependency was established between the need of the U.S. economy for chea~ (exploitable) 
labor and the Mexican need of employment. Toward the later half of the 191 century, the 
immigration gradually transformed into more of a tradition out of the dependency. As 
such, many Mexican laborers came to the U.S. to work for other reasons than income for 
food. Nowadays, it quite common for a Mexican owning a large farm, by Mexican 
standards, with cattle, corn, wheat, etc., for example, to habitually work in the U.S. fields 
for extra income. There is an obvious disparity between the i:r-.comes one can earn in 
Mexico and that earned in the U.S. An hour worked in the U.S. is worth considerable 
more in dollars than an hour in Mexico. 
As hinted at above, the extra income is used for many things besides supporting 
oneself and family. Many Mexican labors return to Mexico with their incomes to pay off 
debts, educate themselves or their families, save, start a business, buy land, buy 
machinery or equipment for a farm or business, move up the social ladder, and/or 
improve their communities. 
Work and money are not the only reasons for a Mexican today to come to U.S. 
either. Some Mexicans come to visit friends and family, learn English, learn a trade or 
skill, marry, verify or deny stories brought back by ex- workers, see the world, or simply 
undertake an adventure. The last example has become such a reality that adventuring to 
work in the U.S. is seen as a test of or passage into manhood for young men in some 
Mexican communities. Thus, one must realize that are many personal motives for a 
Mexican to come and work in, say, a field picking cucumbers or in a restaurant washing 
dishes than just causative economics. 
The Cross 
Crossing the border legally from Mexico to the U.S. is relatively safe, quick, and 
orderly. However, with so many U.S. employers to willingly or ignorantly hire illegal 
immigrants, Mexicans are encouraged to cross illegally. Unfortunately, as many 
immigration groups assert publicly and many more U.S. goverqnent officials and 
employers need to recognize, the illegal cross into the United States is difficult and very 
dangerous. 
Most crossers hire coyotes (animals seen as wild and pesky by Americans but 
clever and sly by Mexicans), which charge a crossing fee in exchange for guidance to the 
other side. The crossers typically seek out a coyote recommended by relatives and 
friends. Contracting the wrong coyote could result in misguidance, theft, or even murder. 
There have even been instances when a Mexican parent will hire a coyote to carry the 
child to the other parent in the U.S. and the coyote will steal the baby and sell it to 
childless parents in the U.S. for a large sum. 
Coyotes will typically lead their groups of immigrants on foot across the northern 
Mexico/ southern U.S. desert. The crossers are always in danger of being apprehended 
by the INS Border Patrol and must spend hours hiding. Bee..: JSe of this and geographical 
reasons, the trip is normally quite long (many times more than a week in length). Often 
the travelers relinquish their supplies of water and food, especially if they get lost, 
commonly resulting in death by dehydration. 
Walking is not the only way to cross illegally, however. Some crossers are 
stuffed into trunks of cars and risk death by affixation during the long trip. Some crowd 
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onto very old and very dangerous buses appropriately nicknamed "buses of death". 
Finally, others acquire plane tickets and fly into the U.S., perhaps the safest method, but 
run a higher risk of being discovered upon arrival. 
Life in the United States 
Their Dreams 
As emphasized previously, Mexicans come to the U.S. to work for many personal 
reasons well beyond concerns of finding their next meal. Americans tend to believe that 
since the U.S. is "the land of opportunity", any incoming foreigners must undoubtedly be 
able achieve their dreams in paramount satisfaction. This is not the case. Many 
Mexicans, legal and illegal alike, discover firsthand that the United States is not what 
they had hoped and dreamed it would be. Thus, many say, "Nunca regresaria" or "I 
would never go back." Numerous Mexicans, however, do find the U.S. to be the provider 
of their dreams and comment that their trip was, "fabuloso"*. 
The Work 
This is not to say that immigrant Mexicans are simply given the answer to their 
desires. Harmonious with the saying, they are only provided with the opportunity. This 
opportunity is typically in the form of long, hard, physical labor, such as agricultural 
labor, for minimum pay. It is also not uncommon for these people to be exploited at the 
work place by not receiving adequate wages, not being informed (or being misinformed) 
of work-site dangers, and not given due worker protections and benefits+. Unfortunately, 
Mexican workers typically encounter similar mistreatment by the large farm and industry 
owners in their own country. 
American Stereotypes 
The lack of respect by U.S. employers and the U.S. as a whole towards 
immigrating foreigners (especially Mexicans) is at the heart of the work site mistreatment. 
The stereotypes of Mexicans in the U.S. are evidence of the ignorance that fuels this 
disrespect. The most common of these stereotypes is that the Mexican is lazy. Anyone 
who knows what many Mexicans must go through in the U.S. to earn a wage knows that 
this untrue. Other stereotypes state that Mexicans are drug- traffickers, criminals, and 
dangerous. Yes, some are. Yet so are other foreign immigrants of different countries and, 
in fact, U.S. citizens themselves. 
The most popular stereotype of the Mexican worker is that Mexicans steal U.S. 
jobs. Once again, this is not very accurate. First, one must I1~.1te that the U.S. would not 
have built the economy and, therefore, established the power it now enjoys if it were not 
for the hard work and sweat of immigrant workers of the past. Second, the U.S. still 
depends on immigrant labor, especially that from Mexico in the agricultural and 
• Davis, Marilyn P. Voces Mexicanas, Suenos Americanos. Mexico D.F.: Henry Holt and Company, Inc. 
1993. 
+ Here, I do not want to suggest that all U.S. agricultural employers disrespect and abuse their foreign 
employees. In fact, there are many employers who treat their foreign employees well and beyond the 
standard of ethical actions. 
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processing industries, to this day. In fact, there is an attitude Ill the U.S. towards some 
jobs as "Mexican jobs". In other words, to except employment for this time of work is to 
lower oneself to the level of a Mexican. Perhaps this explains high unemployment in the 
agricultural areas of California during peak harvest season*. 
Other Challenges 
Crossing the border, work- site exploitation, and general disrespect are not the 
only hardships faced by Mexican immigrants in the U.S. today. Housing, for example, is 
often a challenge. To afford rent, many Mexicans will reside in a small dwelling and 
sleep side-by-side on the floor. There are also situations where immigrants, unable to 
find housing due to a lack of funds or discrimination, will construct make- shift houses 
out of discarded materials that resemble the housing one would see in the shanty towns of 
Sao Paulo or Mexico City. 
The Mexican culture is challenged in the U.S. as well. The more the Mexican 
immigrants are exposed to the U.S. way of life, typically the more 'Americanized' they 
become. Eating habits are changed, spirituality/ religion is changed, and ideals of 
collectivism are replaced by individualism. Perhaps most notably, immigrant Mexicans 
learn how to be consumers. They begin shopping in supermarkets and buying modern 
conveniences like cars, washing machines, and microwaves. 
Despite the conveniences of the U.S., many immigrants often develop nostalgia 
for their homeland and the longing to reunite with family and loved ones left behind. 
Despite the daily hardships encountered in Mexico, most immigrants love their homeland; 
perhaps a love more true and real than any American for the U.S. through the Mexican 
sense of community. To combat the loneliness, immigrants will begin starting families in 
the U.S. This runs great risks for illegal immigrants since they are in constant fear of 
deportation. As one undocumented Mexican who married in the U.S. stated in regards to 
deportation, "How am I going to leave my wife and children ... ? When you are married, 
the two people are one ... + 
Those Left Behind 
Those who leave to work in the U.S. are not the only Mexicans who endure 
hardships. The friends, families, and communities left behind face adversity: 
economically, emotionally, and spiritually. Because the majority of the immigrants are 
males, there occurs a serious change in the traditional family structure, labor roles, and 
psyche in the home communities of the immigrants. After the immigrants leave for the 
U.S. border, these communities resemble those during times of war. In other words, only 
the women, the elderly, and the young remain. There still remains a strong sense of 
'division of labor'** within the Mexican culture. Therefore, when men leave to work in 
the U.S., there becomes a lack of hands in the fields that must be replaced by the women 
or contracted out to battalions of hired youngsters (typically comprised of male youths 
too young to venture to the U.S.). If the women undertake the work, this directly alters 
*Refer to Opinions Concerning Aglobs '99 ('00) 
+Davis, Marilyn P. Voces Mexicanas. Suenos Americanos. Mexico D.F.: Henry Holt and Company, Inc. 
1993. 
**In simple terms, the men typically labor outside the home while the women are the caretakers within it. 
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the tradition of division of labor. If the young perform the work, the opportunity cost is 
their education. This undoubtedly would contribute to the under-education of males in 
these Mexican communities in combination with those young men who abandon school 
to work in the U.S. Although teachers in Mexico site that immigrating youth return with 
skills in the technical fields, such as mathematics, they do not receive the overall, well 
rounded education a youth should receive. 
The Mexican community can drastically change not only when its members leave 
for the U.S., but also when they return horne. Returning immigrants carry with them the 
foreign things to which they became accustomed to while in the U.S. This includes the 
English language, American music, American dress, American modernity, individualism, 
consumerism, and the concept of gangs. 
As previously mentioned, the sums of money sent and carried back can change 
the community structurally. With their American income, the immigrants can invest in 
their communities through the installation of public works, the erection of new buildings, 
or the repairing of existing structures. The new construction bares with it the American 
architectural style. Houses and building in the communities begin to look more modern 
and have modern technology, especially in respect to communication, installed. The 
churches, as well, begin to adapt a more protestant appearance, more predominant in the 
U.S., from the traditional look of Mexican Catholicism. 
Bringing these changes and the American experience, the returning immigrants 
become what is known as a 'subculture' within their horne communities. Many have 
learned, at least partially, the English language, dress differently, and have created a 
sense of fraternity that only those who made the trip can relate to and enjoy. Despite 
their changes, the returned are perceived as heroes for their contributions to the 
communities and are rewarded with respect, prestige, and honor. However, they also 
receive respect from using their earned income in a capitalistic manner elevate 
themselves from the life of a poor campesino. Thus, the pride of hard, laborious farm 
work is decreasing in these communities, especially in the minds of its youngsters as they 
begin to value the advances of the returned immigrants. It appears nowadays, therefore, 
that only the seniors of the community still desire to fight for agrarian rights. As a 
consequence, the culture of the campesino is fading in response to this valuing of 
individual ascension reflecting American economic values. 
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PART VI- CONCLUSIONS 
Even though H-2A reform, a new guest worker program, and/or any type of 
amnesty may be delayed or prevented because of the U.S.'s reaction to immigration 
control in response to the recent terrorist tasks, a few conclusions in respect to improving 
the H-2A program and U.S. immigration policy can be presented from the information 
presented. 
First and foremost, one can postulate that there is an undeniable connection 
between the content and problems of the Bracero Program and those of the current H-2A 
Temporary Agricultural Worker Program. First, both programs contain vague provisions 
that contain words or phrases like "prevailing", "equivalent size/ occupation", and "active 
recruitment". The resulting consequences have been employer confusion about their 
requirements and the exploitation of foreign nonimmigrant workers. Second, the U.S. 
enforcement of the worker protections/ benefits and U.S.labor law was not sufficient 
during the Bracero Program and likewise with the H-2A program. Thus, foreign workers 
are susceptible to continued exploitation. Finally, the actual worker protections, benefits, 
and wages enumerated under both programs are inadequate. The nonimmigrant workers 
were and are underpaid for their strenuous labor, often don't receive the benefits owed to 
them, and are not protected under all U.S.labor and immigrant law. Therefore, unless the 
Bracero Program is no longer used as a model for the guest-worker program, these same 
problematic aspects of guest-worker programs will consistently reappear in a reformed 
H-2A program or in the construction of a new guest-worker program. 
Unfortunately, it appears that past reform and much of the current H-2A reform 
are not addressing these issues but the issue of facilitating the access to foreign labor. 
However, a large increase in the use of the program (i.e. mor\ legal H-2A guest workers) 
by employers does not indicate that the program would then be corrected. Reverting to 
the Bracero Program, despite the large number of Mexicans loaned to U.S. agricultural 
employers, one should not consider it a complete success due to its problems with, for 
example, employee guarantees (now redrafted in the H-2A program). Therefore, 
employer difficulty in acquiring guest workers is not the only pwblem with the current 
H-2A program. 
This is not to say that inaccessibility (i.e. timeliness and affordability) is not a 
problem with the H-2A program. It has been such a deterrent that agricultural employers 
request fewer than 50,000 H-2A guest workers in 2000. As such, employers are turning 
to the employment of large numbers of illegal laborers thus encouraging more illegal 
immigration. 
The failing of the H-2A program is not the root cause of great immigration of 
illegal immigrants, however. The phenomenon originated and was amplified through U.S. 
dependency on cheap labor to expand the agricultural industry and the Mexican need to 
secure jobs for its citizens during its industrial development. This dependency was 
established during the Bracero Program with the influence of American capitalism on the 
PRI and the Mexican economy. 
As a result, the U.S. agricultural industry is progressing and broadening with the 
use of cheap labor (mainly from Mexico but also from other countries with 'high labor 
capital') as seen with other U.S. industries in South Korea, Southeast Asia, Eastern 
Europe and Latin America. However, the agricultural industry has one limitation that 
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other U.S. industries did not. Agricultural companies cannot move production overseas 
to the labor. Thus, the labor must be imported and a program, namely the H-2A program, 
regulating the entrance of this labor must be established. So if this program does not 
function well, employers will obviously turn to "importing" the labor illegally to continue 
taking advantage of developing countries "comparative advantage" in cheap labor. This 
has obviously been problematic. 
Like other U.S. industries with operations overseas, the agricultural industry 
consistently has presented these workers with inadequate worker protections, wages, 
benefits, and working conditions. Also similar to other U.S. industries, many agricultural 
employers consider this exploitation quite justified, as they must be doing the employees 
a favor for hiring them to begin with. Fortunately, since the disrespected foreign labor is 
on U.S. soil, the nation can witness the inhumane results of these practices and become 
educated as to the true reality behind the immigration phenomenon. 
The Mexican perspective illustrates that there exist strong causes and motives 
behind Mexican immigration above the stereotypes. Macro-economical causes, U.S. 
imperial expansion, U.S. economic and capitalistic influence, the resulting Mexican 
economic dependency, and the American self-interest to encourage or prosecute illegal 
immigration as economically needed have together helped to shape the current labor 
relationship between U.S. and Mexico. At a micro level, there exist personal motives for 
a Mexican to work in the U.S. above and beyond financial necessity; motives which 
Americans must recognize as extremely similar to their own economic intentions and 
aims. Furthermore, during their period of work in the U.S., foreign workers must leave 
behind friends and family, face significant obstacles and dangers, and face an entirely 
different society and culture all while working strenuous, monotonous jobs for minimal 
pay. 
Witnessing the maltreatment of the foreign workers, the true reasons behind 
immigration, and the hardships endured by the foreign laborers, one would hope that any 
H-2A reform would establish better working and living conditions. However, 
immigration reform may be quite difficult given the three- sided debate among 
agricultural employers, labor organizations, and the U.S. government. The labor 
organizations heavily promote the reforming of the H-2A provisions that support these 
practices. However, it has been shown that in past reform bills these groups have 
accepted the absence of these reforms provided the bill included an amnesty provision. 
On the other hand, conservative legislators have not supported any type of amnesty. 
Even if such a bill (streamlining the H-2A, amnesty, but no guarantee revision) 
did pass, would such reform facilitating employer access actually push employers to 
obtain temporary foreign labor legally as opposed to illegal! y? Perhaps not. The 
tradition of Mexican illegal immigration has become so strong that there will still be large 
numbers of illegal immigrants willing to work for a wage cheaper than their legal 
counterparts. Even if an employer could easily acquire an H-2A nonimmigrant worker 
within a short period at minimum wage, illegal workers will still be more quickly and 
more cheaply accessible. Undocumented workers are unlikely to be covered under most 
federal and state labor laws. 
Perhaps the concurrent passing of an amnesty provision would officially and truly 
establish a surplus of labor within the agricultural industry leaving no room for illegal 
employment. Yet, the 1986 amnesty illustrated that an amnesty does not necessarily halt 
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illegal immigration. Once legal, ex- illegal laborers would realize that they would be 
more likely to find employment with better wages, better protections, and year- round 
employment. Thus, the agricultural employers will again be faced with hiring illegals or 
making their jobs more attractive to domestic workers. 
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PART VII- RECOMENDATIONS 
Perhaps the only definite conclusion one can make about importing foreign labor 
and the H-2A Temporary Agricultural Worker Program is that perhaps no one solution is 
possible. There are too many factors and opposing forces playing roles in reform efforts. 
However, below are a few recommendations to those working to reform the H-2A 
program and U.S. immigration policy. 
1) Above all, the H-2A program or any new guest worker program should be 
ethically sound. Foreign laborers simply deserve better guarantees (wages, 
benefits, and protections) and respect. These workers are not beasts of burden. 
They are hard working people with families, goals, and dreams like any citizen of 
the U.S. For any program admitting temporary nonimmigrant workers to not be 
covered by the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act is 
appalling and unacceptable. This protection should be backed with stronger 
enforcement at federal and state levels. Furthermore, the President needs to create 
an immigration cabinet position. Such a position will keep the White House 
updated on immigration issues, especially those concerning undocumented labor, 
and facilitate discussion between the government and labor organizations. Finally, 
the responsibilities of the Secretary of Labor should include the welfare of 
undocumented workers. 
2) Increasing worker protections, benefits, and wages with reform of the H-2A 
program (or under a new guest worker program) will only make the program 
more costly for employers, causing them to not use the program and continue 
hiring illegal workers. Thus, a compromise must be met between decreasing 
employer costs and increasing worker guarantees: 
a. A compromise can be met in regards to the housir1g requirement. A housing 
allowance would aid many more agricultural employers in affording the use of the 
program. Therefore, this housing allowance reform should be similar to the one 
included in the AgJOBs bills. The employer would have the responsibility of 
finding the to-standard housing for his/ her employees. In this way, the overall 
cost of the employer guarantees would be more affordable while the workers are 
guaranteed adequate housing. This would cost the hiring company more time but 
annual hiring of H-2A employees will most likely lead to the annual occupancy of 
the same housing. 
b. The burden of testing the labor market for sufficient domestic labor or adverse 
effects should be the responsibility of the U.S. government. It seems quite 
plausible that U.S. government can easily research and consistently update this 
information so that is instantly accessible when an employer wishes to contract 
nonimmigrant laborers. This will make the program more affordable for 
employers and will allow them to request workers much closer to the date of need 
as the time needed to test the market after the request would be eliminated. 
Perhaps, a new government agency can be establishec that can collect these data, 
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enforce the provisions of foreign worker programs, and seat a member on the 
White House cabinet. A special government agency dealing specifically with 
immigration issues and possessing influence in the White House is long over due. 
3) The H-2A program contains vague and confusing for H-2A employers. Any 
H-2A reform or the passage of a new guest worker program should enumerate 
provisions more directly and clearly. Also, a new concise employer handbook 
should be written by the Employment and Training Administration and released 
to agricultural employers. 
4) Tile gal immigration must be stopped, not because foreigners are breaking the law, 
but because of the dangers and the exploitation associated with the phenomenon. 
In respect to the agricultural industry, illegal immigration can be stopped through 
the discontinuation of illegal employment that is haulted by an adequate supply of 
labor. The question then is whether an amnesty would finally provide an 
adequate supply of labor to agricultural employers. The GOA in '97 report 
established that there was a surplus of agricultural labor in the U.S. when 
undocumented laborers were included. Therefore, an amnesty should numerically 
provide a sufficient, legal labor pool for the agricultural industry. Yet, this labor 
supply may not be stable as many newly legal workers may find employment in 
more attractive industries thus defeating the purpose of the amnesty to provide a 
sufficient labor supply. A prerequisite for the adjustment of status requiring 
undocumented laborers to work in the agricultural industry for a certain period of 
time would prevent this exodus from the agricultural industry. Many would 
rightly draw parallels between such an amnesty prerequisite and indentured 
servitude. However, as long as the required agricultural work was not excessive 
(not beyond three years perhaps), this may be the only answer to a very 
complicated issue. Furthermore, if these illegals do not receive an amnesty and 
choose to continue working in the U.S., they would most likely continue working 
within the agricultural industry anyway. Finally, the work requirement would be 
for time after the amnesty becomes law. Proving the time worked after amnesty 
enforcement is more plausible than proving past (illegal) years of time worked. 
5) The amnesty granted in 1986 illustrated that perhaps amnesties do not ultimately 
stop illegal immigration. Therefore, the agricultural industry must take a further 
step in keeping its workforces legal. A uniform, electronic, instant verification 
service must be established. Allowing potential employees the opportunity to 
fraudulently reproduce 20 different verification documents is ridiculous. 
Furthermore, agricultural employers need to receive proper education in respect to 
different verification documents and any new verification system established. 
Hopefully recommendations of this kind (or versions there ot) will correct the 
problems with the current nonimmigrant temporary worker program and step U.S. 
immigration policy in the right direction. If these recommendations function as written, 
the operating of the H-2A program (or any new guest-worker program) will more 
adequately provide worker guarantees, be less costly, take less time, be more easily 
understood, and begin decreasing ever-dangerous illegal immigration. However, the 
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issue of immigration is very complicated in U.S. especially in light of the recent terrorist 
attacks. Thus, any reform will be difficult to gain support from all involved parties and, 
therefore, must proceed with caution. 
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APPENDICIES 
Appendix 1- Article 29 of the Mexican Federal Labor Law 
All contracts for Mexicans lending services outside of the country are to be in 
writing, are to be legalized by the local municipal authorities of the place they are 
entering, and overseen by the Consul of the host country. All contracts must contain the 
following provisions or the contracts are deemed invalid: 
1) Employer or contractual parties will pay transportation costs, subsistence costs, and 
any other costs as a result from the immigration of the employee and his family from 
the point of origin to the border point. 
2) The employee shall be paid in full the salary contracted. 
3) The employer must issue a bond or deposit cash in the Bank of Workers or, in the 
absence of this in the host country, in the Bank of Mexico (in satisfaction with the 
respective labor authorities) the amount of the repatriation costs.* 
4) Once it is proven that the employer has paid the contracted employee in full, the bond 
will be cancelled or the deposit will be returned. 
• The third provision did not apply to the United States during the program because of the transportation 
and subsistence cost reimbursements enumerated within the Bracero contract. 
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Appendix II- Adverse Effect Wage Rates by State: Years 1999-2001 
2001 Adverse Effect Wage Rates (AEWRs) 
State 2001 AEWR 
Alabama.................................................... $6.83 
Arizona.................................................... 6.71 
Arkansas................................................... 6.69 
California................................................. 7.56 
Colorado................................................... 7.43 
Connecticut................................................ 8.17 
Delaware................................................... 7.37 
Florida................................................... 7.66 
Georgia.................................................... 6.83 
Hawaii..................................................... 9.05 
Idaho...................................................... 7.26 
Illinois................................................... 8.09 
Indiana.................................................... 8.09 
Iowa....................................................... 7.84 
Kansas..................................................... 7.81 
Kentucky................................................... 6.60 
Louisiana.................................................. 6.69 
Maine...................................................... 8.17 
Maryland................................................... 7.37 
Massachusetts.............................................. 8.17 
Michigan................................................... 8.07 
Minnesota.................................................. 8.07 
Mississippi................................................ 6.69 
Missouri................................................... 7.84 
Montana.................................................... 7.26 
Nebraska................................................... 7.81 
Nevada..................................................... 7.43 
New Hampshire.............................................. 8.17 
New Jersey................................................. 7.37 
New Mexico................................................. 6.71 
New York................................................... 8.17 
North Carolina............................................. 7.06 
North Dakota............................................... 7.81 
Ohio....................................................... 8.09 
Oklahoma................................................... 6.98 
Oregon..................................................... 8.14 
Pennsylvania............................................... 7.37 
Rhode Island............................................... 8.17 
South Carolina............................................. 6.83 
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South Dakota............................................... 7.81 
Tennessee.................................................. 6.60 
Texas...................................................... 6.98 
Utah....................................................... 7.43 
Vermont.................................................... 8.17 
Virginia................................................... 7.06 
Washington................................................. 8.14 
West Virginia.............................................. 6.60 
Wisconsin.................................................. 8.07 
Wyoming.................................................... 7.26 
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